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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: An Investigation into the Feasibility of
Onboard Assessments of Competency during
Port State Control Inspections
Degree: MSc
This dissertation is an investigation of the feasibility of conducting onboard
assessments of competency during Port State Control (PSC) Inspections by
examining the potential issues involved in the conduct of such assessments and
possible solutions to these issues.
PSC is an acknowledged part of the safety net designed to eliminate substandard
shipping from the world’s oceans.  Provisions for PSC written into international
conventions ensure that Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) have the power to check
the human systems of a vessel just as thoroughly as the structural systems of a vessel.
Onboard assessments permitted by international conventions, in particular STCW 95,
have the potential to change the conduct of PSC Inspections to reflect the emphasis
on human factors that currently dominates the debate on maritime safety.
The present conduct of PSC Inspections worldwide is investigated, with an emphasis
on situations where the PSCO must assess mariner competency.  A definition of
onboard assessment of competency is proposed and situations which fit the
parameters of this definition are analyzed with the intent of codifying standard
terminology and procedure as a partial solution to some of the issues raised.
The concluding chapters propose a starting point for future work in the area of
onboard assessments with special emphasis on training as a potential solution, and
propose a standard frame of reference for worldwide application of onboard
assessments as part of Port State Control efforts
KEYWORDS:  Port State Control, Assessment, Shipboard, Competency, Training
vTABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration ii
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract iv
Table of Contents v
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
List of Abbreviations xi
1 Introduction and Research Methodology
1.1  Introduction 1
1.2 Research objectives and methodology 6
2 IMO Conventions and Port State Control: Provisions
For Onboard Assessments of Competency
2.1 Introduction 8
2.2 SOLAS 74 9
2.3 The International Safety Management (ISM) Code 10
2.4 MARPOL 73/78 11
2.5 STCW 78 12
2.6 STCW 95 13
2.7 Onboard assessments of competency 14
2.8 Types of onboard assessment 15
3 The MOU View of the Provisions for Onboard
Assessments in IMO Conventions
3.1 Introduction 17
3.2 Paris MOU 18
vi
3.3 Statistics regarding onboard assessment from the
Paris MOU 21
3.4 Tokyo MOU 23
3.5 Statistics regarding onboard assessments from the
Tokyo MOU 24
3.6 Vina del Mar MOU 25
3.7 Statistics regarding onboard assessments from the
Vina del Mar MOU 26
4 Questions Regarding Onboard Assessments of Competency
4.1 Introduction 27
4.2 Question 1: What conditions will prompt an onboard
assessment under STCW 95? 31
4.3 Question 2: What can practically be assessed during
an onboard assessment? 33
4.4 Question 3: What evaluation criteria should be used? 34
4.5 Question 4: What are the results of an onboard
assessment?
4.6 Question 5: How much time will onboard assessments
add to a PSC Inspection? 36
4.7 Question 6: Are PSCOs adequately trained to be able
to conduct onboard assessments? 37
4.8 Question 7: Are there any legal issues involved? 38
4.9 Question 8: Is there really a need for onboard assessments
of competency during a PSC Inspection? 38
4.10 Fraudulent seafarer documents 40
4.11 Transitional provisions 41
4.12 The "White List" 42
4.13 Corruption 44
vii
5 Toward a Harmonized Approach to Onboard Assessments
5.1 Introduction 45
5.2 Acceptance of standard terminology 46
5.3 Standardized purpose for onboard assessments of
competency 50
5.4 Reducing subjectivity 52
5.5 Legal issues 53
5.6 Fraudulent seafarer documents 54
5.7 Transitional provisions 55
5.8 The "White List" 55
5.9 Corruption 55
6 The Port State Control Program in the United States
6.1 Introduction 56
6.2 History and legal basis 56
6.3 Training for Port State Control personnel 58
6.4 Background of personnel involved in the U.S. Port
State Control program 58
6.5 Current operational procedures in PSC exams 60
6.6 Onboard assessments of crew competency 64
6.7 Comments on the status of the U.S. Port State Control
Program 68
7 Training of Port State Control Officers
7.1 Introduction 69
7.2 Experience of PSCOs 69
7.3 Importance of PSCO training on onboard assessments
of competency 71
7.4 Specific aspects of training for PSCOs 73
viii
7.5 Recommended training for the U.S. PSC Program 75
7.6 Additional comments on USCG PSCO training 78
8 Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1 Introduction 80
8.2 The need for onboard assessments: the GMDSS case 80
8.3 Review of the objectives of this dissertation 82
8.4 Conclusions 83
8.5 Recommendations 84
References 85
Appendices
Appendix A List of nations participating in each MOU 89
Appendix B Sample of MERPAC assessment standard table
for advanced fire fighting 92
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Paris MOU Deficiency Statistics on Onboard Assessments 22
Table 3.2 Tokyo MOU Deficiency Statistics on Onboard Assessments 24
Table 4.1 Excerpt from STCW 95 Table A-VI/3 on Adv. Firefighting 35
Table 6.2 U.S. Coast Guard PSC Detentions 1992-1999 66
Table 6.3 U.S. Detention Category Statistics for 1999 67
xLIST OF FIGURES
Figure 6.1 USCG Boarding Priority Matrix 61
Figure 7.1 Recommended Training for U.S. PSCOs 75
xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AB Able-bodied Seaman
AIS Automated Identification System
AMSA Australia Maritime Safety Authority
AT Annual Training
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display
FSI Flag State Implementation Subcommittee (IMO)
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress Safety System
G-MOC USCG Office of Compliance
ICLL International Convention on Load Lines
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISD Instructional Systems Design
ISM International Safety Management (Code)
MARGRAD Maritime Academy (US) Graduate
MARPOL Marine Pollution
MERPAC Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory Committee (USCG)
MIC Marine Inspector Course
MMIRRG Merchant Marine Individual Ready Reserve Group
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSC Marine Safety Committee (IMO)
MSPOC Marine Safety Petty Officer Course
NMC National Maritime Center
NVIC Navigation and Vessel Information Circular
PSC Port State Control
PSCO Port State Control Officer
SIRC Seafarer’s International Research Center
SMS Safety Management System
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
xii
STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
U.S. United States
UK P&I United Kingdom Protection and Indemnity (Club)
UK United Kingdom
USCG United States Coast Guard
USMMA U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
1Chapter 1
Introduction and Research Methodology
1.1  Introduction
Nations have long been able to check foreign-flag vessels calling on their ports to
ascertain compliance with both international conventions and domestic law.  Only
within the past ten years has the term Port State Control become a standard name for
this process.   As an example, the United States began checking foreign-flagged
passenger vessels for compliance with certain domestic laws as early as the 1970s;
however, the official U.S. Port State Control program was not created until the mid-
1990s.   Whatever the terminology used, the past five years have witnessed a
dramatic growth in the significance of Port State Control as it has become an
acknowledged part of the global effort to eliminate substandard shipping from the
world’s oceans.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has supported Port State Control
(PSC) objectives and has fostered a regional approach.  The result is that PSC is
executed in most parts of the world by large cooperative groupings of countries based
on a document called a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  Members of each
MOU are obliged to follow the directives and regulations of their particular MOU.
At this time, there are eight MOUs in place:  Paris, Tokyo, Vina del Mar (South
America), Caribbean, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, Abuja (West Africa), and Black
2Sea; one on the drawing board: Persian Gulf; and one nation, the United States
(U.S.), operating unilaterally due to domestic law.  Appendix A contains a list of
nations involved in each MOU.
Port State Control provisions are written into many of the IMO’s conventions.  These
include:  the International Convention on Load Lines 1966 (LL66); the International
Convention on Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS 74); the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978
(MARPOL 73/78); the International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78); and the
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995 and 1997 (STCW 95).  The control
provisions in all conventions focus primarily on the verification of certificates issued
under each convention. A representative example of the wording of each convention
is found in the SOLAS 74 Convention, which states in regulation 19:
Every ship when in a port of another Party is subject to control by officers
duly authorized by such Government in so far as this control is directed
towards verifying that certificates issued under regulation 12 or regulation 13
of this chapter are valid.
Although the regulations continue to include other circumstances, it is important to
note that the drafters of IMO conventions generally saw PSC activities as a certificate
check.  The underlying presumption was that the flag state or classification society
issuing certificates under each convention had already ensured that the certificates
reflected the reality of the condition of the ship and seafarers.
Major marine casualties in the 1980s and 1990s led to the realization that the
presence of certificates on a ship was not necessarily an indicator of safety and that
3human factors were not adequately accounted for in the IMO conventions.  Casualty
investigations confirmed the latter revelation, and contributed the statistic that 65%
to 80% of maritime casualties were due in whole or in part to some sort of human
error (United States Coast Guard, 1996).  The implication was that the issue of
certificates under various IMO conventions had become somewhat of a paper
exercise, and that some flag states and classification societies were not doing a
thorough job of oversight.
IMO responded by encouraging flag states and classification societies to improve the
quality of their processes, and by making an urgent effort to revise the convention
which dealt primarily with human factors, namely STCW 78, a document which was
generally seen as weak and easy to circumvent.  In his book which elucidated the
proceedings of the revision process, Captain W.S.G. Morrison (1997, p. 19)
commented on the urgency of revising STCW 78:
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, investigations of shipping casualties and
pollution incidents and public inquiries into shipping disasters repeatedly
identified human error in the operations of the ship as the major contributory
factor.  This further eroded any remaining confidence in the value of STCW
78.
Amendments to STCW 78, commonly known as STCW 95, came into force in
February of 1997.
Among other accomplishments, STCW 95 expanded port state options for exercising
control over foreign-flagged vessels in the ports of that state.  Specific provisions
will be discussed later in this paper, but it is important to note that this move was not
intended to undermine flag state supremacy, but rather, it was an attempt to
complement flag state efforts. This objective was manifested in IMO resolution A787
4(19), which was designed to set global standards for PSC activities.  Section 1.3.3 of
this resolution states:
. . . control procedures are complementary to national measures taken by
Administrations of flag States in their countries and abroad and are intended
to provide assistance to flag State Administrations in securing compliance
with convention provisions in safeguarding the safety of crew, passengers and
ships, and ensuring the prevention of pollution.
 The expectation was that port states and flag states would be cooperating with each
other as well as with the other parties with a vested interest in maritime safety,
including classification societies, insurers, ship owners, and ship operators in the
battle against substandard shipping.
The new approach embodied in STCW 95 took into consideration the idea that
human systems needed to be checked just as thoroughly as structural systems.  The
flag state and the classification society were responsible for periodically ensuring that
the structural systems of the ship met and continued to meet international standards.
However, there was a gap when it came to periodically checking the “human
systems” of a vessel.  The flag state was still responsible for the training and
certification of seafarers and the condition of a vessel entitled to fly its flag, but after
initial certification of seafarers, the flag state was primarily focused on structural
systems.  There was no provision for periodic checks on the competency of seafarers
to which many of the casualties of the past two decades were attributed.
Prevailing practice in seafarer training, certification and crewing further contributed
to the recognition of a need for periodic checks.  The typical cycle was this:  A
seafarer (either officer or rating) was certificated by a flag state, which depended on
training institutions of varying quality to assess the competency of seafarers.  The
seafarer then offered his or her skills to the market.  A crewing company or a
5shipping company determined the validity of the qualifications (by a certificate
check), and the seafarer went to work, many times on a ship which was not of the
same flag as his or her nationality or license.  Continuing competence on the job was
not addressed in subsequent flag state and classification society surveys, which
tended toward checking only structural systems of a vessel.
Only in nations which had an assessment or exam for upgrading licenses would a
seafarer’s continued competency be ascertained.  Thus, a seafarer who remained at
the same level, such as able-bodied seaman (AB) for an entire career would only be
examined at the entry level.  An officer who had a license from a nation which only
assessed competence at the entry level (front-ended system) would similarly not be
checked.  An engineer with a license from one nation and sailing under an equivalent
license from another nation without a training infrastructure would also not be
checked.  Furthermore, as many of the expectations of competency were in
emergency procedures that were not performed on a regular basis, an erosion of skills
was the logical result.
STCW 95 was a double-edged effort to ensure mariner competence.  Flag states were
tasked with assessing competence, not only at the entry level, but at several levels in
a seafarer’s career.  Licensing changed from primarily examination-based to
competency-based.  Flag states were also required to provide documentary evidence
of an effort to give “full and complete effect” to STCW 95 by means of a submission
to the IMO.  Most importantly for this discussion, PSC was recognized as a point at
which an oversight for compliance with STCW 95 and hence, crew competence,
could be performed.  Strengthened and clarified control provisions allowed a Port
State Control Officer (PSCO) to perform an “onboard assessment” of crew
competency under certain conditions.
6Section B/I-4, of the STCW Code, while non-mandatory, states simply the
philosophy behind the strengthening of the control provisions in STCW 95.
Paragraph one of this section says:  “The purpose of the control procedures of
regulation I/4 is to enable officers duly authorized by port states to ensure that the
seafarers on board have sufficient competence to ensure safe and pollution free
operation of the ship.”  The Code continues in paragraph two:  “This provision is no
different in principle from the need to make checks on the ship’s structures and
equipment.  Indeed, it builds on these inspections to make an appraisal of the total
system of on-board safety and pollution prevention.” (STCW Code, 1995, p. 177)
Port State Control regimes have been slow to recognize and hesitant to exercise the
strengthened control provisions granted to them under STCW 95.  There are several
reasons for their hesitation, not the least of which are a number of transitional
provisions which render STCW 95 largely unenforceable until 2002.  Other issues
involving objectives, procedures, legality and training needed for PSCOs to fully
enforce the STCW 95 Convention are also unresolved.
1.2 Research objectives and methodology
A desirable goal is, when the transitional provisions expire in 2002, PSC personnel
worldwide are ready to use STCW 95 in a uniform, consistent, legal manner which
complements and continues ongoing efforts to enhance maritime safety worldwide.
To these ends, specific objectives of this paper are:
• to ascertain prevailing attitudes of those involved in PSC activities (MOUs,
USCG, industry, P&I clubs, and seafarers) about the practicality and necessity of
onboard assessments of competency.
7• to address concerns raised within the framework of what is permitted under
international conventions and what is practical under prevailing conditions in the
maritime industry.
• to emphasize the need for international standardization of terms, operational
procedures, purpose for detentions, reporting procedures, and analysis of
information with regard to onboard assessments of competency.
• to propose a starting point for standardization of PSC efforts with regard to
onboard assessments of competency.
• to investigate the training needs for a consistent application of PSC efforts.
In order to achieve these objectives, interviews with persons involved in PSC
supplemented by a literature search will be conducted.  This information will then be
compared to the control provisions contained in international conventions as they
relate to onboard assessment of seafarers and interpretations of these conventions by
various MOUs and nations.  An analysis of the more common questions and issues
related to onboard assessments will provide a starting point for recommendations for
the uniform implementation of provisions relating to onboard assessments.  These
recommendations will include a section on training necessary to fully implement
STCW 95 from a PSC perspective.  Chapter 6 and part of Chapter 7 will specifically
investigate the U.S. PSC program.
8Chapter 2
IMO Conventions and Port State Control: Provisions for
Onboard Assessments of Competency
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will investigate the IMO conventions which currently allow for onboard
assessment of mariner competency, and how these provisions are interpreted by the
IMO.   There are several provisions currently in place which allow a PSCO to assess
the competence of mariners onboard the ship during PSC inspections. The IMO has
consolidated provisions from all of the applicable conventions and written them in
IMO Resolution A787 (19).  This document has been simplified further in a booklet
published by the IMO in 1997 entitled Procedures for Port State Control.
Amendments to IMO Resolution A787 (19) were accepted in 1999 and are contained
in IMO Resolution 882 (21).
First, it is necessary to define the term onboard assessment.  A definition contained in
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Circular 853 for “shipboard assessment” is
adequate for this purpose.  It says:  “Shipboard assessment is a process by which
shipboard performance is observed, measured, and compared to standards of
performance in order to determine a mariner’s proficiency.” (MSC, 1998)   An
onboard assessment related to PSC, then, is simply the evaluation of an individual’s
competence during a PSC Inspection to perform a particular task which the
applicable conventions state that person should be able to perform.
9All PSC Inspections begin with a certificate check.  Common to all conventions is
that if a PSCO has “clear grounds” to suspect that the certificates do not reflect the
reality of the condition of the particular vessel or the competency of its crew, then the
PSCO may require seafarers to perform certain operational procedures which are
required for each convention.  These procedures are outlined in Resolution A787
(19).  This type of action is called "operational control" by the IMO.  According to
the working definition of onboard assessment presented earlier, this operational
control is an assessment of competency because it is an evaluation of a seafarer’s
competence to perform a specific task.  As an example, the provision for operational
control of the muster list states:  “The PSCO may determine whether the crew
members are familiar with the duties assigned to them in the muster list, and are
aware of the locations where they should perform their duties.” (IMO Res. A787(19),
1995, section 3.5.4) To ascertain this, a PSCO would have to assess whether a
particular seafarer knew the location of his or her muster station, and what duties
were assigned upon arrival to the muster station.
A short analysis of the conventions which allow for onboard assessment during PSC
Inspections follows:
2.2  SOLAS 74
SOLAS 74, chapter XI, regulation 4, part 1 states:
A ship when in a port of another Contracting Government is subject to
control by officers duly authorized by such a government concerning
operational requirements in respect of the safety of ships, when there are clear
grounds for believing that the master or crew is not familiar with essential
shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships.
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A footnote in the SOLAS text refers the reader to IMO Resolution A787(19).
Section 3.5 of this resolution, entitled, “Guidelines for Control of Operational
Requirements,” contains relevant sections which apply to SOLAS.  Under this
convention, a PSCO may ascertain the effectiveness of a muster list, and the degree
to which crewmembers are aware of their duties.  A PSCO may require the crew to
perform a fire or abandon ship drill.  A PSCO may also ensure that crewmembers are
familiar with the fire control plan and the damage control plan.
If a discrepancy is found between what a seafarer should know and the results of an
assessment, then SOLAS advocates:  “. . . the Contracting Government carrying out
the control shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail until the
situation has been brought to order in accordance with the requirements of the
present Convention.” (SOLAS 74, 1997, p. 456)
2.3  The International Safety Management (ISM) Code
The ISM Code, as part of SOLAS, has the same control provisions as the rest of the
convention.  Since its implementation for some ships in 1997, assessment of this part
of SOLAS has focused on the officers’ and crewmembers’ knowledge of the
company Safety Management System (SMS).  This is usually accomplished by a
series of questions to the officers and crewmembers.  One particular point is that the
ISM Code requires that a seafarer who is newly assigned and in a position related to
safety or environmental protection be familiarized with his or her duties.  It also calls
for essential information required by seafarers prior to sailing to be given and
documented. The retention of such information by a particular seafarer may be
assessed.
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2.4  MARPOL 73/78
Control provisions under MARPOL are similar to those in SOLAS.  Each annex of
MARPOL has a provision for exercise of control concerning operational
requirements.
Each says:
A ship when in a port of another Party is subject to inspection by officers duly
authorized by such Party concerning operational requirements under this
Annex, where there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are
not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the prevention of
pollution by (oil-annex1, noxious liquid substances-annex 2, harmful
substances-annex 3, garbage-annex 5).  (MARPOL 73/78, 1997, pp. 49, 251,
342, 366)
Referring back to Resolution A787(19): Under MARPOL, a PSCO may assess,
among other things, the familiarity of an officer with handling of bilge water, oil,
garbage, or dangerous goods.  In addition, a PSCO may ask to witness operational
requirements outlined in any of the annexes. (IMO Res. A787(19), 1995, section 3.5)
If the particular persons responsible for such requirements are unable to respond
appropriately, then the PSCO “. . . has to exercise professional judgement to
determine whether the operational proficiency of the crew as a whole is of a
sufficient level to allow the ship to sail without . . . presenting an unreasonable threat
of harm to the marine environment. " (Procedures for Port State Control, 1997, p. 19)
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2.5  STCW 78
Under STCW 78, a PSCO may conduct an “assessment of the ability of seafarers to
maintain watchkeeping standards if there are clear grounds for believing that such
standards are not being maintained . . . .”  (STCW 78, p. 18)  STCW 78 specifies
certain clear grounds.  Generally, these are evidence that the conditions on the ship do
not correspond with the certificates held by the ship, or evidence that officers or
crewmembers are not familiar with procedures necessary to run a safe and pollution-
free ship.
STCW 78 further contains three specific situations when clear grounds exist.  First,
the ship has been involved in a casualty, specifically, a "collision, grounding or
stranding".  Second, the ship has had an illegal discharge of substances (under an
international convention) either in a berth in port or at anchor.  Third, the ship "has
been maneuvered in an erratic or unsafe manner," including ship operations in which
"safe navigation and procedures have not been followed". (STCW 78, pp. 18-19)
When clear grounds are established by the PSCO, then a “more detailed inspection”
can be initiated.  Included in this more detailed inspection is a provision for
"operational control" or "operational checks".  These checks not only verify that the
equipment is working, but also, an individual seafarer’s ability to operate the
equipment on that specific ship.
Under STCW 78, PSCOs may check that the officers on a ship know the action to be
taken if the ship is damaged, and check for compliance with the shipboard damage
control plan.  A PSCO may check that an officer knows how to operate the
navigational equipment on the bridge or if persons engaged in handling cargo are
able to conduct cargo operations safely and know the dangers involved with a
particular cargo.  A very important issue with regard to operational checks is that a
PSCO may see if ship's personnel are able to operate machinery such as the
13
emergency generator, the fire pumps, the emergency steering mechanism, the lifeboat
engine, or the fire detection system, among other items.
If the ship's crew cannot demonstrate the procedures to the satisfaction of the PSCO,
then detention is an option.  As it is written, detention may be exercised over a ship if
it can be determined that a seafarer who needs to hold a certificate does not hold one;
if watch arrangements do not conform to flag state requirements; if there is no one
competent in a watch who can operate navigation or pollution prevention equipment;
or if sufficiently rested persons are not available to take watch during first watch or
any other watch.
2.6  STCW 95
STCW 95 takes STCW 78 a step further.  In addition to the aforementioned three
circumstances for establishing clear grounds, a fourth has been added: “the ship is
otherwise being operated in such a manner as to pose a danger to persons, property,
or the environment.”  (STCW 95, p. 25)  The STCW Code clarifies this and describes
specific situations which can be considered to pose this danger.  These coincide with
the detainable deficiencies listed in STCW 78 (STCW 95, p. 25):
• failure of seafarers to hold a certificate
• failure to comply with safe manning
• failure of navigation or engineering watch arrangements to conform to
requirements specified by the Administration.
• absence in a watch of a person qualified to operate equipment essential to safe
navigation, safe communications or prevention of marine pollution
• inability to provide for the first watch at the commencement of a voyage . . .
persons who are sufficiently rested.
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 If a ship cannot correct any of these deficiencies, then the PSCO must use his or her
judgement and determine if the situation on the ship poses “a danger to persons,
property, or the environment.”  (STCW 95, p. 25) If so, the ship may be detained
until the problem is corrected.
 
 2.7  Onboard assessments of competency
 
 A provision contained in STCW 78 is that control exercised by a PSCO is limited to
three situations: verification of certificates, verification that ship’s crew conforms
with the safe manning document, and most importantly for this discussion:
“assessment of the ability of the seafarers of the ship to maintain watchkeeping
standards as required by the convention if there are clear grounds for believing that
such standards are not being maintained because any of the following have occurred .
. .”  (STCW 78, p. 18-19)  These provisions are found in the preceding section on
“clear grounds.”  STCW 95 uses almost identical language in Regulation I/4 section
1.3.  But a major difference between the two documents is that STCW 95 contains
the phrase “assessment, in accordance with section A-I/4 of the STCW Code . . .”
(STCW 95, p. 25) thus correcting a major shortcoming of STCW 78, that is the lack
of guidance for the conduct of onboard assessments of competency.
 
 The STCW Code was written along with the revised STCW Convention to amplify
some aspects of STCW 78 which were seen as unclear or weak.  Section A-I/4 of the
STCW Code, entitled “Control Procedures” elaborates on these onboard assessments
of competency, imposing several conditions:
• the occurrences in paragraph 1.3, section A-I/4 need to have occurred
• the assessment is a "verification" that the crewmembers responsible for either the
occurrence or the mitigation of the occurrence have the skills "related to the
occurrence."  For example, if a ship is involved in a steering casualty which
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results in a grounding, the crew may be assessed in emergency steering
procedures, or other subjects relevant to the casualty
• the relationship to the ISM code must be considered in an assessment
• certificates of seafarers should be checked as the first part of an any assessment
• a demonstration can be required at the workplace (i.e. on the ship)
• the demonstration of competency can cover both watchkeeping standards and
operational requirements
• the assessment cannot be beyond a seafarer's certificated level of competence
• only the "methods for demonstrating competence” together with the “criteria for
its evaluation" in part A of the STCW Code can be used
Part B of the STCW Code, which is optional, further amplifies this information, and
supplies some of the “why?” behind both the provision for and the stipulations of
onboard assessments.  In chapter one, which referenced the first two provisions of
Part B, an analogy was drawn between the need to check a ship’s human systems just
as much as a ship’s structural systems.  In addition, Part B comments on three
important elements of the differences between STCW 78 and STCW 95: reducing
subjectivity by relating assessment to criteria in Part A of the STCW Code, the
connection of nature of the clear grounds with the subject of assessment, and the
importance of professional judgement when making a determination of whether any
shortcomings in individuals assessed make the ship “a danger to persons, property or
the environment”. (STCW 95, p. 177)
2.8 Types of onboard assessment
Based on the information from the various conventions, three types of onboard
assessment can be identified:
1. Operational checks under the SOLAS 74 and MARPOL 73/78 Conventions
2. Fire and boat (abandon ship) drills
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3. Onboard assessment of watchkeeping skills as provided for in STCW 78 and
STCW 95.
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Chapter 3
The MOU View of the Provisions for Onboard Assessments in
IMO Conventions
3.1 Introduction
The seven MOUs have based their PSC programs on IMO Conventions and their
interpretations of provisions for PSC largely reflect guidance given by the IMO,
specifically, Resolution A787(19) and Res. 882(21), which provided amendments to
A787(19).  Guidance from the IMO indicates that provisions in STCW 95 should not
be enforced at this time because of the transitional provisions in place until 01
February 2002.  For this reason, the MOUs are still requiring STCW 78 compliance.
The U.S. is enforcing some of the more urgent requirements of STCW 95 (as
outlined in chapter 6).
This chapter is not intended to be an overview of the MOUs’ PSC programs, but
rather, a look at how three of the more established MOUs are using the three
previously identified types of onboard assessment; operational checks, fire and boat
drills, and onboard assessment of watchkeeping skills as provided for in STCW 78
and 95, during PSC Inspections.  The three regions surveyed are the Paris MOU,
Tokyo MOU, and the Vina del Mar (South America) MOU.
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3.2  Paris MOU
Section 3.1 of the Paris MOU on PSC first directs a PSCO to visit a ship to check
certificates and documents.  It then advocates a walk-through inspection for the
PSCO to see if the overall condition of the ship and crew “meets generally accepted
international rules and standards.”  (Paris MOU, 1982, section 3.1)  If a PSCO has
“clear grounds” to believe that the certificates on the ship do not reflect the condition
of the ship or crew, either an expanded inspection or a more detailed inspection may
be conducted.
An expanded inspection is one which is required every 12 months for certain types of
ships, namely, certain oil tankers, bulk carriers older than 12 years, passenger ships,
and gas and chemical tankers over 10 years old.  No clear grounds are required for
vessels in this category; however, clear grounds are required for other types of ships
for which a PSCO deems an expanded inspection necessary.
The Paris MOU states that for all ships subject to expanded inspection, a PSCO may
check crewmembers’ ability to operate a number of systems onboard, including: the
emergency generator, emergency lighting, emergency fire pump, bilge pumps,
watertight doors, remote emergency stops for certain equipment, steering gear,
emergency power to communications gear, oily water separator, and the lowering of
a lifeboat to the water. (Paris MOU, 1982, section 8.4.2)  This section is very
extensive and contains all of the provisions listed in IMO Resolution A787(19).
In the case of an expanded inspection for other than ships required to have an
expanded inspection every 12 months, and those ships which need a “more detailed
inspection,” the “clear grounds” provision is relevant.  Section 3 of the Paris MOU
states:
The Authorities will regard as ‘clear grounds’ inter alia the following:
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• a report or notification by another Authority
• a report or complaint by the master, a crew member, or any person or
organization with a legitimate interest in the safe operation of the ship,
shipboard living and working conditions or the prevention of pollution,
unless the Authority concerned deems the report or complaint to be
manifestly unfounded.
• other indications of serious deficiencies, having regard in particular to
Annex I.  (Paris MOU, 1982, section 3)
 
 Further, the Paris MOU makes a distinction between clear grounds for a more
detailed inspection and clear grounds for conducting operational checks:
 For the purpose of control on compliance with onboard operational
requirements, specific ‘clear grounds’ are the following:
• evidence of operational shortcomings revealed during PSC procedures in
accordance with SOLAS 74, MARPOL 73/78, and STCW 78
• evidence of cargo and other operations not being conducted safely or in
accordance with IMO guidelines
• involvement of the ship in incidents due to failure to comply with operational
requirements
• evidence, from the witnessing of a fire or abandon ship drill, that the crew are
not familiar with essential procedures
• absence of an up to date muster list
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• indications that key crew members may not be able to communicate with each
other or with other persons onboard (Paris MOU, 1982, annex I, section 4)
 
 Provisions for the “more detailed inspection” are found in annex 1, section 5.  In this
section is the authority for a PSCO to test operational requirements relating to
emergency musters, drills, communications, SAR plan, bridge operation, cargo
operations, machinery operation, and compliance with shipboard and company
manuals.
 
 Detention is always an option in cases in which a ship is found deficient in any
operational area.  The Paris MOU charges PSCOs with exercising professional
judgement to:
 determine whether the operational proficiency of the crew as a whole is of a
sufficient level to allow the ship to sail without danger to the ship or persons
onboard, or presenting an unreasonable of harm to the marine environment.
(Paris MOU, 1982, annex I, section 5.5.3)
 
 Further guidance in exercising professional judgement to determine if deficiencies
are serious enough to warrant a detention is found in section 6.3.  This section gives
several circumstances related to the vessel’s “forthcoming voyage.”  These criteria
may be framed into a series of questions.  On the forthcoming voyage, can the ship:
• navigate safely?
• handle, carry and monitor cargo?
• operate the engine room safely?
• maintain proper propulsion and steering?
• fight fires in any part of the ship?
• abandon ship correctly?
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• prevent pollution?
• maintain adequate stability?
• maintain adequate watertight integrity?
• communicate in distress situations?
• provide safe and healthy conditions onboard?
 If the answer to any of these questions is negative in the PSCO’s judgement, “the
ship should be strongly considered for detention”. (Paris MOU, 1982, annex I,
section 6.3)
 
 3.3  Statistics regarding onboard assessments from the Paris MOU
 
 It is difficult to analyze specific instances where an onboard assessment has been
used as the statistics on the results of onboard assessments during PSC Inspections
are either not reported or sometimes mixed in with other categories.  For example,
failure of an operational check of emergency communications equipment could be
listed in one of several categories:  “safety in general”, “radio”, “operational control-
SOLAS,” or even “ISM”, depending on the nature of the deficiency.  The most
relevant categories for deficiencies found after an operational control are:  “safety in
general--musters and drills,” “operational control SOLAS” and “operational control
MARPOL.”  A chart of three years of enforcement for these categories follows on the
next page:
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      Table 3.1  Paris MOU Deficiency Statistics on Onboard Assessments
 Safety in General  1997  1998  1999
 Musters and drills  266  382  432
 
 Operational Control SOLAS  1997  1998  1999
 Musters/drills/communication  269  316  352
 Fire/damage control plan  177  185  220
 Bridge/engine room/cargo operations   57   84   76
 Manuals/instructions, etc.  162  190  295
 Other   58   56   32
 Total (for Operational control SOLAS)  723  831  975
 
 Operational Control MARPOL  1997  1998  1999
 Oil/oily mixtures in machinery spaces   85  102  106
 Garbage  138  381  382
 Other   39   63   70
 Total (for Operational control
MARPOL)
 262  546  558
 Source:  1999 Annual Report-Paris MOU on PSC
 
 Clearly, there has been a rise in detentions for operational checks, both SOLAS-
related and MARPOL-related.  The Paris MOU concluded:
 A development of growing concern is the substantial consistent increase
recorded in operational deficiencies related to safety and environmental
procedures.  Over a four-year period these deficiencies have increased by
74%.  In the light of recent disasters, ship owners and flag States should
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recognise the seriousness of these figures and take adequate measures to
improve operational safety onboard. (Paris MOU, 2000, p. 1)
 3.4  Tokyo MOU
 
 The Tokyo MOU is very similar to the Paris MOU.  Section 3.1 of the Tokyo MOU
states that a PSCO will first conduct a certificate check for compliance with
international conventions.  PSCOs will also look at various areas of a ship, including
accommodation spaces, the engine room, and the galley to get an impression of the
overall condition of the ship.  A more detailed inspection will be carried out if
certificates are not valid or if a PSCO has clear grounds for believing that a ship or
crew does not meet the actual requirements of international conventions, or if
certificates attesting to compliance are absent.
 
 The provisions for clear grounds with regard to compliance with operational
requirements are identical to the Paris MOU provisions (Greenaway, 1998, p. 19):
• evidence of operational shortcomings revealed during PSC procedures in
accordance with SOLAS 74, MARPOL 73/78, and STCW 78.
• evidence of cargo and other operations not being conducted safely or in
accordance with IMO guidelines
• involvement of the ship in incidents due to failure to comply with operational
requirements
• evidence, from the witnessing of a fire and abandon ship drill, that the crew
are not familiar with essential procedures
• absence of an up-to-date muster list
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• indications that crew members may not be able to communicate with each
other or with other persons onboard.
 The elements of a more detailed inspection are the same as outlined in the Paris
MOU in the preceding section.  Detention criteria are found in Appendix 1 of IMO
Resolution A.787 (19).
 
 3.5  Statistics regarding onboard assessments from the Tokyo MOU
 
 The 1999 report for the Tokyo MOU also recognized an increase in MARPOL-
related operational deficiencies, but a decrease in SOLAS related operational
deficiencies (though not large enough to represent a trend).
      Table 3.2  Tokyo MOU Deficiency Statistics on Onboard Assessments
 Category  1997  1998  1999
 SOLAS related operational deficiencies  1,757  3,047  2,641
 MARPOL related operational deficiencies    183    486    814
 Source:  1999 Annual Report Tokyo MOU on PSC
 
 As a representative sample of the Tokyo MOU, the 1999 report of the Australia
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), elaborated on these statistics indicating
increases in operational deficiencies statistic by including in the text of their annual
report for 1999, this statement:
 The other noticeable increasing trend is with deficiencies related to the
operational aspects of the ship.  Muster list, communication, fire drills,
abandon ship drills, bridge, cargo and machinery operations are included in
this deficiency category.  Over the years, AMSA surveyors have expanded
their inspections from the traditional check of the physical condition of the
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ship and its equipment to also include the crew’s ability and familiarity with
the safe and pollution free operations of their ship. (AMSA, 2000, p. 9)
 3.6  Vina Del Mar (South America) MOU
 
 PSCOs in the Vina del Mar region (South America) initially survey the ship for
validity of certificates and documents, as do the other regions.  However, in a break
from the others, the agreement mandates checking for compliance with operational
requirements as part of the initial inspection.  If a ship is not in compliance with
conventions, including operational requirements checked in the initial inspection,
then the PSCO may conduct a more detailed inspection.  As with the Paris and Tokyo
MOUs, a form of clear grounds, called “clear indications” for a more detailed survey,
are listed (Greenaway, 1998, p. 26):
• A report or notification from another Maritime Authority
• A report or complaint from the Master of the ship, a member of the crew
or any other person or organization interested in maintaining the safety of
operations of the ship or in preventing marine pollution, unless the
respective Maritime Authority considers that the report of the complaint
are evidently groundless.
• other signs of serious deficiencies
 Similar to the other MOUs, the Vina del Mar MOU specifics more “clear
indications” for operational checks, including (Greenaway, 1998, p. 26):
• Evidence of operational failures verified during PSC procedures of ships,
pursuant to SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW 78
• ship involvement in incidents arising from non-compliance with
operational requirements
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• Ascertained evidence, during fire fighting drills and/or ship deserting
drills, that the crew is not familiar with basic procedures
• Lack of an updated muster plan
• Indications that it is impossible for the key members of the crew to
communicate among themselves or with other persons onboard
Detention is an option if the ship is found not to be in compliance with any aspect of
any international convention.
3.7 Statistics regarding onboard assessment from theVina del Mar MOU
The author was unable to retrieve any annual statistics on PSC activities in the Vina
del Mar MOU region.
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Chapter 4
Questions Regarding Onboard Assessments of Competency
4.1 Introduction
One of the most significant changes made to STCW 78 in STCW 95, was the
strengthening of control provisions.  To understand the implications of this change, it
is first necessary to understand the shortcomings of STCW 78.  The drafters of
STCW 78 intended for the convention to establish global minimum professional
standards for seafarers.  It was written as primarily a flag state document, with the
expectation that flag states would implement these minimum standards for
certification of seafarers or use them as a guide for implementing more stringent
standards.  Dr. Rolf Schulte-Strathaus (1998, p. 31) commented on what really
happened:
In practice STCW 78 standards were regarded as a maximum level of
education and training that was often not reached or enforced by the Flag
States.  Therefore the quality of training throughout the world’s merchant
fleet still varied widely.
Rather than being the end of the improvement process, STCW 78 was revealed to be
only a small step in the right direction.  Major shortcomings in the convention were
noted within the first five years of its existence.  According to the IMO, STCW 78
suffered because of a “general lack of precision in its standards, the interpretation of
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which was left ‘to the satisfaction of the Administration.’”  (IMO, 1997, p. 2) The
result of this shortcoming was “. . . Widely varying interpretation of standards and
many Parties failed to effectively administer and enforce Convention requirements.
STCW certificates could no longer be relied upon as evidence of competence.”
(IMO, 1997, p. 2)
The coordinator of the group of international consultants who participated in the
revision of STCW 78 was Captain W.S.G. Morrison, who wrote a book intended to
facilitate understanding of the process of that revision.  According to his book, there
was a rapid expansion of the maritime labor pool from nations that did not have
maritime training infrastructures subject to control and audit, a situation described by
him:
Experience within the shipping industry soon indicated that large numbers of
poorly trained seafarers were being granted STCW certificates of
competency.  Since both well-trained and poorly trained seafarers were issued
exactly the same type of certificate, the only means of identifying one from
the other was through evaluating their performance onboard after they were
already employed. (Morrison, 1997, p. 18)
In addition to within a company, the other place where these variations in
competence were manifest was during PSC Inspections.
A series of high profile casualties with significant loss of life and pollution cases that
caused severe damage to the marine environment occurred in the 1980s and early
1990s.  The much publicized “human factor” relating to these accidents served to
turn the heretofore unconcerned public into a vocal lobby highly critical of the
shipping industry and the IMO and its work, especially STCW 78.  The Secretary
General of the IMO, William O’Neil, called for an urgent revision of STCW 78,
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using consultants working for the STW Subcommittee to prepare the new
convention.  To further enhance the speed at which the convention was implemented,
a tacit acceptance procedure was used.  This meant, that unless one third of the
Parties or the Parties whose combined merchant fleets constituted not less than 50%
of the world tonnage rejected it, the amendments would enter into force in one to two
years.
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995 and 1997 (STCW 95) and the
Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code (STCW Code) came into
effect on 01 February 1997.
Before STCW 95 came into effect, PSC was recognized as a time during a seafarer’s
career in which a third party could observe performance on the job.  Thus, the
enhancement of the PSC provision was seen as one of the priorities for the revised
STCW Convention.  However, the drafters realized that certain conditions would
have to be placed on such procedures in order to prevent PSCO carte blanche.  This
intention is stated in IMO guidance:
Enhanced procedures concerning the exercise of Port State Control under
Article X of the Convention have been developed to allow the competence of
seafarers in carrying out watchkeeping to be assessed and to permit
intervention in the case of deficiencies deemed to pose a danger to persons,
property and the environment. (IMO, 1997, p. 7)
The conditions that were placed on PSC procedures were outlined in chapters two
and three as “clear grounds.”
Under STCW 95, PSCOs are tasked with checking certificates of competency, and
making a judgement as to whether or not they reflect the reality of the crew’s
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competency, based both on what has happened immediately preceding the inspection
or observation during the inspection.  If these circumstances meet the criteria of clear
grounds, then, a PSCO has an option to assess the watchkeeping skills of
crewmembers as compared to the tables in the STCW Code.  Then, he or she must
make another judgement as to whether or not whatever level of competency he or she
finds poses a danger to persons, property or the environment, and if so, whether to
recommend the vessel for a detention until the problem can be rectified.
From chapter two, the definition for shipboard assessment as presented in MSC
Circular 853 is:  “. . . a process by which shipboard performance is observed,
measured, and compared to standards of performance in order to determine a
mariner’s proficiency.”  (MSC Circular 853, 1998)  Current PSC practice reveals
three categories which are assessments:
 Based on the information from the various conventions, three types of onboard
assessment can be identified:
1. Operational checks under the SOLAS 74 and MARPOL 73/78 Conventions
2. Fire and boat (abandon ship) drills
3. Onboard assessment of watchkeeping skills as provided for in STCW 78 and
STCW 95.
 A distinction is made between operational checks and fire and lifeboat drills because
the two items focus the PSCOs attention in a different way.
 
 The first two types of assessments, operational control for various operational aspects
of the conventions and fire and lifeboat drills under SOLAS are currently performed,
and are accepted as a part of an expanded PSC inspection in the more established
MOUs and part of the general inspection in the United States and Vina del Mar
MOU.  The third type of assessment, that prescribed in STCW 78 and elaborated in
STCW 95 is the most problematic in terms of uniform worldwide implementation,
and that will be the focus of this chapter.  Information from the offices of the MOUs
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and the U.S. Coast Guard indicate that assessments of competency under STCW 95
are not being used at this time due to several uncertainties and issues involved with
full implementation of this option.
 
 This chapter contains an enumeration of several issues that come to mind when
considering implementing the onboard assessment provision of STCW 95.  They are
framed as questions.  The first eight questions are intrinsic to the idea of onboard
assessments.  The last four are issues not necessarily limited to onboard assessments,
but rather, they are concerns that are more broadly linked to PSC in general.
 
 4.2 Question 1:  What conditions will prompt an onboard assessment under
STCW 95?
 
 The four items that would alert a PSCO to conduct an assessment are termed “clear
grounds” for believing that watchkeeping standards according to STCW 95 are not
being maintained (STCW 95, p. 25):
• collision, grounding or stranding of ship
• illegal discharge of substances from ship
• the ship has been maneuvered in an unsafe manner
• the ship is being operated in a manner which may “pose a danger to persons,
property or the environment.”
 
 The fourth clear ground is the most open to interpretation.  STCW 95 continues with
five criteria that can be used as evidence of the clear ground that the ship may pose a
danger to persons, property and the environment.  These may be phrased as questions
based on the provisions found in STCW 95, Regulation I/4, paragraph 2:
 1.   Do all seafarers hold a certificate or dispensation?
 2.   Does the ship comply with the safe manning document of the administration?
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 3. Do the navigation and engineering watchkeeping arrangements comply with
Administration guidelines?
 4.  Is there a person in each watch qualified to operate equipment that is needed for
safe and pollution free operation of the ship?
 5.  Are there enough persons onboard who are sufficiently rested to cover the watches
required?
 
 The Paris MOU, Tokyo, and Vina del Mar MOUs have not specified any additional
clear grounds for STCW assessments, either 78 or 95, however, they do have
additional clear grounds for control of operational requirements, which would prompt
a “more detailed inspection,” which would include operational checks (assessments).
These additional clear grounds are specified in chapter three, but some of them are:
evidence of operational shortcomings with regard to IMO conventions, including
failure of a fire or boat drill or questionable cargo handling practices; absence of a
current muster list; and indications that the crew may not be able to communicate
with each other.
 
 The U.S. Coast Guard has specified additional clear grounds as well.  These are:
crew unable to perform fire and lifeboat drills, watchkeeping officers cannot
communicate with the PSCO in English, crewmembers cannot operate shipboard
equipment required for operational tests, observation by the PSCO that ship
personnel are unfamiliar with the ship or their duties, and the crew not being able to
communicate with each other.  (NVIC 3-98, p. 8)
 
 Although these clear grounds are similar, they are not exactly the same.  This lack of
standardization with regard to clear grounds can be confusing to the flag state and the
seafarer.  A related issue is the potential fitness of a seafarer who has been involved
in an incident that would provide the clear grounds for the conduct of an assessment.
A mariner who has been involved in a casualty such as a grounding, stranding, or
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illegal discharge of substances is usually not at his or her best mentally or
emotionally.  It would be difficult to rely on the validity of an assessment conducted
under such circumstances.
 
 4.3  Question 2: What can practically be assessed during an onboard
assessment?
 
 Modern shipping requires that a ship spend a very limited amount of time in port.
Cargo loading and discharging, crew changeovers, inspections by classification
societies, flag states and cargo and charter concerns all need to be completed during
the time in port.  The in port work of a ship usually involves every crewmember.  In
this environment, what can be completed during an onboard assessment?
 
 Capt. J. Brusseau of the U.S. Coast Guard (2000, p. 66) writes about the problem:
 . . . the assessment scheme under the STCW Code has the effect of
broadening those criteria considerably, to include virtually every aspect of
ship operations where a seafarer is involved as a human element.  . . . on one
hand, ship operators are concerned that a comprehensive assessment would
make everything about the ship subject to the PSCO’s microscopic scrutiny.
PSCOs, on the other hand, are concerned about the time and expertise it
would take to do a full assessment.
 
 Clearly, there is a need for published, specific boundaries with regard to onboard
assessments.  In addition to the time element, what type of assessment can reasonably
be expected for a platform that is not operating?  For example, is an assessment on
position fixing possible when the ship is tied to the dock?
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 4.4  Question 3: What evaluation criteria should be used?
 
 In giving “full and complete effect” to the Convention, many nations are finding that
STCW 95 specifies certain items as criteria for evaluating competence, but that this
is not detailed enough in how to execute the assessments.  This is important with
regard to Section A-I/4 paragraph 5, which states:  “In the assessment, only the
methods for demonstrating competence together with the criteria for its evaluation
and the scope of the standards given in part A of this Code shall be used.”  (STCW
Code, 1995, p.13)  For example, in Table A-VI/3, which applies to advanced
firefighting, and partially reproduced in Table 4.1, the lack of assessment criteria is
clear.  It would be difficult for a PSCO to use these published and very general
criteria to determine if a seafarer does in fact possess the knowledge of fire fighting
operations at sea.   A recent article comments on this particular shortcoming of the
STCW Code:
 Tables in the STCW Code provide general instructions on the methods and
criteria for evaluating competence, but the terms of reference in these tables
are not specific enough to permit assessments that are both valid and reliable,
and the conditions for demonstration are not stated. (Bobb, 2000, p. 5)
 Please note that only one knowledge is listed in table 4.1 in order to facilitate
comparison with the assessment measures expanded by the USCG in Appendix 2.
 
 Validity and reliability of assessments will be covered in the next chapter, but
shortcomings in the reliability area concern subjectivity in assessing a certain task.
This is an important concern in the area of a PSCO conducting onboard assessments
of competency.
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 Table 4.1  Excerpt from STCW 95 Table A-VI/3 on Advanced Firefighting
 Competence  Knowledge,
understanding and
proficiency
 Methods for
demonstrating
competence
 Criteria for evaluating
competence
 Control fire fighting
operations onboard a
ship
 Fire fighting procedures at
sea and in port with
particular emphasis on
organization, tactics and
command
 
 
Practical exercises and
instruction conducted under
approved and truly realistic
training conditions (e.g.
simulated shipboard
conditions) and, whenever
possible and practicable, in
darkness
 Actions taken to control fires
are based on a full and
accurate assessment of the
incident, using all available
sources of information
 
The order of priority, timing
and sequence of actions are
appropriate to the overall
requirements of the incident
and to minimize damage and
potential damage to the ship,
injuries to personnel and
impairment of the
operational effectiveness of
the ship
 
Transmission of information
is prompt, accurate, complete
and clear
 
Personal safety during fire
control activities is
safeguarded at all times.
                                                                                 Source:  STCW 94, Code A, Table A-VI/3
 
 4.5  Question 4: What are the results of an onboard assessment?
 
 According to Section A-I/4, the results of an onboard assessment will indicate the
ability of seafarers to maintain watchkeeping standards.  Detention of a ship may
result if there is “an absence in a watch of a person qualified to operate equipment
essential to safe navigation, safety radiocommunications or the prevention of marine
pollution.”  (STCW 95, p. 13)  Additionally, the absence of this person needs to be
deemed by the PSCO to pose a danger to persons, property or the environment.  It is
not just the inability to perform a task that sets the criteria for detention, but rather,
the absence of a person proficient in that skill in a watch and the determination that
the absence is a danger.
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 If clear grounds for the assessment are an occurrence such as a casualty, then that
danger has already been determined, and the onboard assessment becomes more of a
judgement of competency of an individual seafarer that merits an investigation by the
flag state or nation that licensed the individual.  Morrison (1997, p. 239) writes:
 Evidence of incompetency may be revealed through poor performance in the
sequence of events leading to or during the incident as judged against the
relevant standard of competence in part A of the STCW Code. If
incompetency is confirmed and poses a direct threat to safety of life or
property at sea or to the marine environment, then steps should be taken to
withdraw, suspend, or cancel the certificate, at least until the competence has
been reestablished.  Weaknesses in performance can be corrected through
refresher or upgrading training.
 
 In considering the results of an onboard assessment, a distinction must be made
between human error and incompetence.  A seafarer may have made an error, but he
or she still knows how to perform the skill in question (is competent).  A finding of
incompetency as defined by Morrison would be difficult to do in the realm of PSC.
 
 4.6  Question 5: How much time will onboard assessments add to a PSC
 Inspection?
 
 There is a provision in all conventions for not delaying ships.  In Article X of STCW
95, this provision reads:
 When exercising control under this article, all possible efforts shall be made
to avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed. If a ship is so detained or
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delayed it shall be entitled to compensation for any loss or damage resulting
therefrom. (STCW 95, p. 12)
 In addition, a ship in port is subject to all manner of inspectors, from flag state
surveyors to classification societies, to purpose inspectors (grain, tankers, passengers,
cargo, etc.).  The maritime press is full of articles and editorials lambasting the
current regulatory climate in port.  Is there enough time to complete an onboard
assessment if needed?
 
 4.7  Question 6: Are PSCOs adequately trained to be able to conduct onboard
assessments?
 
 Ideally, all PSCOs should possess a professional qualification that enables them to
accurately assess a seafarer onboard.  This means they should possess the skill they
are assessing.  Suggested qualifications for those PSCOs carrying out inspections of
operational requirements are found in Section 2.5 of Resolution A787(19):
• qualified as master or chief engineer with seagoing experience
• have maritime-related qualifications (recognized by the Administration) and have
specialized training to “ensure adequate competence and skill”
• be an officer of the Administration and have an “equivalent level of experience
and training” in the conduct of operational checks.
 The last two provisions are concessions to nations who do not possess the maritime
infrastructure necessary to find PSCOs who fulfill the first prerequisite.  This is
necessary because, currently, a minority of nations have PSCOs who are qualified in
the skills that they could be judging in the case of an onboard assessment.  The
United States is one such nation in which the professional qualifications of PSCOs
vary widely.  Also, many developing nations or small nations with very few
convention sized ships calling on its ports cannot justify the expense of maintaining a
corps of PSCOs who are so well-trained and could obviously work in some other area
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for more compensation.  How can administrations attract and pay PSCOs with the
appropriate qualifications?
 
 4.8  Question 7: Are there any legal issues involved?
 
 Although onboard assessments are legally within the purview of a PSCO according
to international conventions, the element of subjectivity inherent in onboard
assessments increases the probability of legal issues.  Among these are:
• entitlements for compensation for delay of ships
• who should be contacted prior to an onboard assessment or be present
during an onboard assessment?
• right of appeal of person assessed, master, agent/company
• confidentiality of results
• jurisdiction on parties who have not ratified some or all of the
conventions
 
 4.9  Question 8: Is there really a need for onboard assessments of competency
during a PSC Inspection?
 
 In an article in Proceedings, Captain J. Brusseau stated that practical realities restrict
the need for onboard assessments of competency.  After analyzing the statistics in the
U.S. from Sept. 1, 1998 to August 31, 1999, he remarked:
 If all the ships detained in the U.S. last year had been crewed according to
their Safe Manning Document, with all crewmembers appropriately
certificated, and if those crews had demonstrated they could fight a fire and
launch a lifeboat, then only 4 ships would have been detained for STCW-
related deficiencies.  (Brusseau, 2000, p. 66)
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 He concluded:  “The lesson is pretty clear; most port state control problems go away
by taking care of the basics.”  While he noted that the number of STCW-related
deficiencies remained steady over the months of that year-long period, the actual
number was still low compared to the number of total deficiencies, yet he concluded
that: “. . . it is safe to say the human element in general will remain a prominent focus
of PSC in the U.S. in coming years, certainly until there is a noticeable decrease in
STCW-related deficiencies.” (Brusseau, 2000, p. 66)
 
 Despite this view, there is a general view among those of traditional maritime nations
that the skill level of serving and incoming seafarers is lower than in the past.  This
view is confirmed by a large study undertaken by the Seafarers Industrial Research
Center (SIRC), in Cardiff, Wales, in which marine pilots in various ports were asked
to rate crew competency on vessels that they piloted.  Most of the study (80%) was
completed in six European ports, with the other 20% completed in ten ports in
Africa, Southeast Asia and Australasia.  The pilots were asked to rate the crews on:
the ship’s condition, the Captain and officers’ performance on the bridge, handling
lines and tugs, and ability to communicate with the pilot.  A tabulation of the results
revealed that pilots felt that 25% of ships they evaluated were manned by seafarers
whose competence was “poor”.  Ten percent of ships were reported to have
“abysmal” crew competence.  This study was completed as “. . . a response to a
prevailing view that crew competence was in general a growing problem . . .” (The
Sea, 1999, p. 1)
 
 In addition to this study, the statistics and comments from the 1999 Paris MOU
Annual Report, the 1999 AMSA Annual PSC Report, and the 1999 U.S. Coast
Guard’s Annual PSC Report show an increase in operational deficiencies under the
operational specifications of the conventions, such as fire and boat drills.  Can
PSCOs help in the battle against substandard training of mariners by conducting
onboard assessments, or is there really no need to do them?
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 In addition to these questions specific to onboard assessments of competency under
STCW 95, there are a number of issues that are not necessarily intrinsic to that issue,
but are more generally related to PSC.  These concerns will be presented in the
following paragraphs.
 
 4.10 Fraudulent seafarer documents
 
 The first task a PSCO is authorized to perform onboard a ship is a certificate check.
According to Morrison (1997, p. 41):
 Every certificate must be accepted by port State authorities unless there are
clear grounds for believing it was fraudulently obtained or is being used by a
person other than the person to whom it was issued.  Note that these two
circumstances are the only reasons why a valid certificate is not accepted.
 One trend noted by the IMO in recent years is the proliferation of fraudulent
certificates of competency.   The widespread use of computers and scanners has
made it easier to produce very authentic looking fraudulent documents.  Most flag
states do not have the resources to combat this burgeoning practice.
 
 The IMO MSC has recently commissioned a study to be completed by the Seafarer’s
International Research Center (SIRC) on unlawful practices linked to seafarer
certificates.  Some of the preliminary findings are that there are four main areas of
unlawful practice (IMO, 2000, p. 22):
• seafarers possessing certificates which do not reflect actual functions performed
on the ship or limitations due to tonnage, area of work, etc. or certificates which
are expired
• legitimate certificates issued by a third party based on forged or fraudulently
obtained evidence of competency from the original certification party
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• certificates issued based on flawed or lax examination procedures or official
corruption
• blatant forgeries given by a manning agency or shipowner, or purchased “on the
street”
While the complete research is not available, a recent article in IMO News stated:
“There is evidence to suggest that the problem is more widespread than previously
thought.” (IMO, 2000, p. 22)
4.11  Transitional provisions
Verbal guidance from the IMO given at the MSC Subcommittee meeting in May
1999 stated that nations should not be concentrating on STCW 95 enforcement until
the transitional provisions expire on 01 February 2002.  There are two regulations in
STCW 95 on transitional provisions that are relevant to PSC.  Regulation I/15,
entitled “Transitional Provisions” says that a Party can issue, recognize and endorse
certificates in accordance with STCW 78 until 01 February 2002.  This provision
applies to those seafarers who began their seagoing service toward certification or
their training program prior to 01 August 98.  The U.S. is an example of a nation that
is still issuing STCW 78 certificates for those seafarers who began their service prior
to 01 August 98.  These certificates all expire on 01 February 2002.  Mariners with
existing licenses need to meet STCW 95 requirements and have certificates attesting
to that fact prior to 01 February 2002.
Provisions under Article VII of STCW 95 are harder to understand.  Morrison sheds
some light on the subject:  “After entry into force of the Convention for a Party, its
Administration may continue to issue certificates of competency in accordance with
its previous practices for a period not exceeding five years.” (Morrison, 1997, p. 41)
If a State accepted the STCW 78 Convention after 28 April 1984, the entry into force
of STCW 95 varies.  The implications for PSC are important, as validity of a
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certificate is grounds for a more detailed inspection or an expanded inspection.  A
PSCO who is not fully versed in the individual arrangement for each nation could
unknowingly impose his or her own national requirements on a ship that is fully
compliant with the Convention under their particular arrangement.  As an example,
the STCW Convention entered into force for Estonia on 29 November 1995.  The
Estonian government may continue to issue STCW 78 certificates until 29 November
2000.  This certificate is issued under Article VII, and is considered equivalent to an
STCW 95 Certificate.   It will be valid until 20 November 2005.   However, if the
seafarer wants to serve on a non-Estonian ship, he or she needs to receive an STCW
95 endorsement from the flag state of that ship prior to 01 February 2002.  The IMO
STW Subcommittee has written guidance for this confusing issue in IMO
STCW.7/Circ.1.  A supplement to Morrison’s book contains several tables and a
country-by-country list of the status of the STCW 78 Convention.
4.12  The "White List"
Regulation I/7 of the STCW Convention (amplified by Section A-I/7 of the STCW
Code) requires parties to STCW to submit a report to the IMO that demonstrates that
the party is giving “full and complete effect” to the STCW Convention.  Some
specific items required in this report are a detailed exposition on a nation’s maritime
training and licensing infrastructure, including schools, training centers,
administrative oversight, and certification procedures.  These reports are reviewed by
a panel of “competent persons” for the IMO who make the determination as to the
sincerity of the Party’s efforts toward “full and complete effect”.
According to an article in Proceedings by the chairman of the STW Subcommittee,
Mr. Christopher Young, no results from those reviews of the 81 nations which
submitted their reports prior to the August 1, 1998 deadline are approved for release.
The reason for this is that the MSC does not want to disadvantage any nation because
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of the pace of work produced by its particular panel.  The 72nd (May 2000) meeting
of the MSC indicated that publication of the results would be delayed indefinitely
pending work of all 81 panels.
The anticipation for the results of this list, dubbed “the White List” is intense.
Parties and those in maritime press have added to the hype by creating the perception
that if a party is not on the white list, they must be on a “black list”.  Mr. Young
commented:  “. . . the wording of the STCW Convention does not provide a basis for
automatically presuming that any country which is not yet on the list is fundamentally
in non-compliance with the convention.”  (Young, 2000, p. 62)  He points to the
transitional provisions in place until 2002 and the fact that the process of evaluation
of a party’s QSS under regulation I/8 presupposes the existence of such a system for
five years prior to evaluation as indicia that the white list is not the end of the
evaluation process, but rather just a piece of the puzzle.  He wrote:  “...the working
presumption should be that the Party is making good faith efforts to address
deficiencies and to meet its obligations.” (Young, 2000, p. 62)
Despite the official intentions of the white list process, a review of press articles
seems to indicate that perceptions of the maritime community do not fall in line with
the recommended view.  In a comprehensive UK P&I Club handbook on PSC, the
Secretary General of the IMO was quoted as saying that:
‘Following publication of the list, certificates issued by countries not included
in the list will not be accepted as prima facia evidence that the holders have
been trained and meet the standards of competency required by the
convention.’ (Greenaway, 1998, p. 5)
This comment was not referenced, so it is impossible to check its accuracy.  The
author of the guide commented further:
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The consequence of this will be that ships on which such seafarers are sailing
may suffer costly delays in ports while inspectors verify that they are
competent to safely man the ships, and this may in turn lead to an
unwillingness by foreign shipowners to employ such seafarers. (Greenaway,
1998, p. 5)
Despite the intention of the IMO with regard to the white list, interpretations such as
that published in the UK P&I Club are common.   Parties to the convention who hold
such a view, either publicly or privately, may choose to use absence of another party
on the white list as a clear ground that a ship poses a danger to persons, property or
the environment because the level of training of the seafarers onboard cannot be
ascertained on the basis of their certificates.
4.13  Corruption
The enhanced power given to PSCOs in the control provisions of STCW 95 have
some shipowners and operators wondering whether or not opportunities for
corruption will be enhanced by some degree.  If more opportunities for subjectivity in
detention criteria are introduced into the PSC process, will some PSCOs use the
opportunities for financial gain in return for consideration during an inspection?  This
is mainly a concern in areas where PSC is a fledgling enterprise, or nations that are in
turmoil due to economic or social upheaval.
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Chapter 5
Toward a Harmonized Approach to Onboard Assessments
5.1  Introduction
The questions and issues discussed in the preceding chapter can be addressed
collectively by advocating an approach which at each step bears in mind the greater
objective of Port State Control: to make the maritime industry more safe for
seafarers, ships and the environment.  Onboard assessments of competency have the
potential to directly assist in this goal.  In order to realize this potential,
harmonization as to the reasons, procedures, criteria, purposes for detention, and
training needed to conduct onboard assessments is required.  The only organization
in a position to do this is the IMO.
In addition to enhancing maritime safety by ensuring that seafarers are proficient in
shipboard tasks relating to safety, PSC can play another role.  Dr. Heike Hoppe of the
IMO comments on a global vision of PSC as a knowledge-gathering element.  The
knowledge “will provide the maritime community with the opportunity to better
analyze the causes of incidents and casualties and to ascertain, more accurately than
ever before, how they can be prevented from occurring again.”  (Hoppe, 2000, p. 14)
She continues:
Armed with the information made available as a result of regional
cooperation in PSC, we can work towards a change of attitude within the
shipping industry, where a long tradition of secrecy has often resulted in
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problems being hidden and ignored rather than revealed and solved. (Hoppe,
2000, p. 14)
Onboard assessments of competency have a place in this knowledge-gathering role of
PSC.  The knowledge gained from the onboard assessments conducted on a daily
basis during PSC activities now should be analyzed, and information gathered should
be used to assist in setting procedures for onboard assessments specifically under
conditions enumerated in STCW 95.  At this time, too much uncertainty and
apprehension exists about the provisions in STCW 95 to make it useful in today’s
PSC activities.  Information gained from previous onboard assessment activity
should be used to ensure maritime authorities the STCW 95 provision is only another
form of what is currently occurring in everyday PSC activities.
In addition to commenting on the questions and issues raised in the preceding
chapter, this chapter will provide some suggestions for the IMO to develop a
harmonized approach to facilitate onboard assessments of competency.  This step-by-
step approach contains the following elements:
1.  acceptance of standard terminology
2.  acceptance of what is implied by the terminology
3.  standardized purpose for onboard assessments
4.  reducing subjectivity by good practices
The end of this chapter contains comments on the other issues contained the
preceding chapter: legal concerns, fraudulent documents, transitional provisions, the
white list, and corruption.
5.2  Acceptance of standard terminology
Acceptance of terminology is the first step toward harmonization.  Shipboard
assessment, according to the definition proposed in the preceding chapters, is:  “a
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process by which shipboard performance is observed, measured, and compared to
standards of performance in order to determine a mariner’s proficiency.”  (IMO Res.
853, 1998)  Again, onboard assessments encompass not only those under STCW 95,
but also, operational checks under IMO conventions and fire and lifeboat drills.
These operational checks and drills have been part of a PSC Inspection for many
years, however, they have not been treated as assessments, but rather tasks which a
crew or individual seafarer either passes or fails, based on a PSCO’s professional
judgement.
Once the idea that all these actions during a PSC Inspection are indeed assessments,
standard assessment philosophy and procedures can then be adopted. Although the
competency-based approach embodied in assessments is new to the maritime world,
parallels exist to other industries where this type of assessment has been the norm for
many years.  As a result, a whole body of research and procedure already exists on
competency-based assessments in general. With the advent of STCW 95’s more
competency-based approach to training being about six years old, a body of research
has also appeared in the maritime community as well.  Included in this is guidance
from the IMO in the form of the previously referenced MSC Circular 853.  Though
this document was written with training institutions and companies in mind, the
procedures are relevant to PSC.
Standards of performance are known as criteria.  Parties must recognize that all
assessments must exist with a set of criteria attached.  The drafters of STCW 95
realized that lack of criteria was a major shortcoming of STCW 78.  This was
partially rectified in STCW 95.  According to the STCW Code, “In the assessment,
only the methods for demonstrating competence together with the criteria for its
evaluation and the scope of the standards given in part A of this Code shall be used.”
(STCW Code, p. 13)
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As outlined in the previous chapter, STCW 95 is not detailed enough to permit flag
state assessors or maritime training personnel to complete proper assessments. As an
example, in STCW 95, table A-II/4, the criteria for evaluating a seafarer’s
competence to “steer the ship and comply with helm orders also in the English
language”, and specifically knowledge of use of the gyro-compass in doing this, the
criteria for evaluating competence is:  “A steady course is steered within acceptable
limits having regard to the area of navigation and prevailing sea state.”  What is
missing is the standard for the acceptable limits.  Using guidance on writing
assessments, Dr. Myriam Smith of the U.S. Coast Guard comments on applying
assessment methodology to these rough criteria found in the STCW Code:
An example of an objective might be to assess a mariner’s ability to steer by
gyrocompass.  The corresponding observable measure might be the accuracy
with which the mariner is able to maintain the ordered heading.  The standard
might be to maintain the ordered heading to an accuracy of plus or minus
three degrees.  (Smith, 2000, p. 15)
To rectify this shortcoming in STCW 95, The U.S. Coast Guard’s Merchant Marine
Personnel Advisory Committee (MERPAC) has written specific criteria for many of
the competence tables in the STCW Code.  They used the five steps of Instructional
System Design (ISD) (Bobb, 2000, p. 5):
1. determine the assessment objective
2. determine the assessment method
3. specify the assessment condition
4. develop the assessment measures and standards
5. prepare the assessment package
An example of an assessment from one of the MERPAC tables, and a comparison
with what is written in STCW 95 is found in Appendix B.
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In developing procedures for effective assessment two features must be kept in mind:
reliability and validity.  In commenting on effective assessments of mariner
competence, Dr. Smith (2000, p. 15) wrote:
 . . . an assessment should be a reliable and valid snapshot of the performance
that can be expected from a mariner. A “reliable” assessment is one whose
consistency can be trusted: the same performance will receive the same
assessment every time.  A “valid” assessment is a sample of performance that
includes all the critical components of the function that will be expected from
the mariner onboard the ship.
Factors affecting the reliability of an onboard assessment are the most relevant to this
discussion.  Some of them are: differing procedures and equipment on ships,
differing cultural norms and ways of performing a task, and differing expectations of
the assessor and the persons being assessed.  The fact that onboard assessments can
never really be fully reliable, mostly because of subjectivity, can never be overcome.
However, the factors affecting reliability can be taught and reliability can be
enhanced through proper assessment training for the assessor.
As for validity, observing performance at the job site while operating is optimal.  In
the case of onboard assessments, the ship is not operational, but a high degree of
validity can be accomplished through very thorough up-front planning.  It is
necessary to refine assessment standards further to fit in the operational environment
onboard a non-operating ship, both in terms of time and condition for assessment.   In
a study of the practicality of shipboard assessments conducted by the U.S. Coast
Guard Research & Development Center, with Sea River Maritime, Dr. Smith (2000,
p. 17) found:
. . . that it was difficult for some of the regular ship officers to compete some
of the assessments during the limited time period provided during these trials.
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This suggest the need to more completely integrate the assessment process
into current operations and training, as well as to refine the assessment
procedures to better match shipboard operational conditions and restraints.
A step in that direction is contained in the previously referenced IMO MSC Circular
853.  The second step in preparing shipboard assessments is “select performance
objectives for shipboard assessment.”  Included in this area are the following
considerations:
• safety implications of conducting the assessment
• current shipboard operating conditions, including, environmental conditions,
location, equipment status, workload, and personnel schedules
• the ability to establish adequate controls over shipboard operations
• the candidate’s current skill level, taking into account prior training and
experience
If a potential subject for an onboard assessment is identified and run through this
filter, a manual of assessments which can practically done during a PSC exam while
moored to the pier can be developed.  It should be referenced to STCW and to the
clear grounds that are established.  For example, guidelines for assessing competency
after a ship is observed maneuvering in an erratic or unsafe manner should
encompass elements contained in the STCW Code on navigation at the operational
level and navigation at the management level.
5.3  Standardized purpose for onboard assessments of competency
Once the definition of assessment and what can be assessed is agreed upon, the
purpose for such assessments needs to be standardized.  Referring to STCW 95, the
purpose of an onboard assessment is to ascertain if the proficiency of the seafarers
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onboard meets the criteria spelled out in the STCW Code.  If the proficiency does not
meet these criteria, and, in not meeting these criteria, poses a danger to persons,
property and the environment, then the ship may be considered for detention.  The
intentions of the assessment itself must be differentiated from criteria for detention,
even if the same words are used for each (i.e. clear grounds for the assessment are
“ship being operated in such a manner as to pose a danger to persons, property or the
environment”, detention is because assessment results indicate a “danger to persons,
property or the environment”).
Detention is considered an option rather than a certainty after an assessment is
conducted.  Other options need to be considered.  For example, currently, if a
vessel’s crew fails a fire or lifeboat drill in a U.S. port twice, they may receive
instruction in the port until they can try again.  The purpose of detention then
becomes remedial and not punitive.  This idea deserves some attention because
currently it appears that some MOUs operate on the concept that detention is a
punishment for daring to bring a substandard ship into the MOU’s area.  The
seafarers on a ship often have no control over the ship on which they are working.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that seafarers know about substandard conditions on
their vessels, and the level of competency of their shipmates, yet they cannot speak
out for fear of losing their jobs.
It is important for a PSCO to remember that onboard assessments ascertain the man-
machine interface on a particular ship, not necessarily the competence of the mariner.
He or she could have been put onboard at the last minute by the crewing company,
and not have had time to familiarize himself or herself with all of the equipment.
Despite familiarization procedures required by STCW Section A-VI/1, unfamiliarity
with shipboard equipment is one problem which PSC officers run into quite often.
An onboard assessment which points to lack of familiarity with the equipment on that
particular ship could point to a company shortcoming, either in SMS procedures or in
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internal management.  This information is valuable from the knowledge-gathering
role envisioned by some in the IMO.
In some instances, a shipmaster may welcome onboard assessments of competency.
This gives him or her a third party opinion to use with intransigent owners.  In the
example in the preceding paragraph, the shipmaster could have been concerned about
the practice of crew changes immediately prior to sailing, but could not speak out
against it for fear of losing his or her job.
5.4  Reducing subjectivity
Reducing subjectivity is the next goal.  To clarify the issue, a comment by the flag
state Vanuatu entered into the record at a recent Flag State Implementation (FSI)
Sub-Committee (FSI 8, November 1999) was made with regard to fire and boat
drills:
In most countries such drills are accepted if it is demonstrated that the ship’s
personnel know what they are doing and can perform their tasks satisfactorily.
However, in countries in which the PSCOs have been trained in a military
environment, the PSCOs sometimes involve themselves as part of the
operation . . . If the drill does not meet the PSCO’s military training standards
- which may be appreciably higher than merchant vessel standards - and
expectations, the vessel is detained.
One conclusion of the USCG’s study of conducting assessments on Sea River
Maritime tankers, was that the more guidance which was given to the assessor, the
less subjectivity was introduced into the assessment process.  To reduce subjectivity
inherent in the assessment process, detailed checklists with options were used in the
Sea River Maritime trials.  Although this approach is derided by some, it is the best
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solution for reducing subjectivity, but only when accompanied by assessment
training.
5.5  Legal issues
Many of the legal issues listed in the preceding chapter can be taken care of with a
standard set of internationally agreed procedures for onboard assessments, including
who may be contacted, who may be present, the right of appeal, and the
confidentiality of results.  In setting these standards, it is important to note that a
PSCO must work rapidly in executing PSC, and that any intervention by agents or
lawyers contributes to any delays which may occur.  Since the conduct of onboard
assessments is not new, there should be little cause for a change in procedures
relating to legal issues during assessments.
Contact of the flag state representative is another matter.  According to STCW 95,
Article X, the flag state must be contacted if any deficiencies are found under
paragraph one of that article or procedures in regulation I/4.  Under the first
paragraph of article X, if a fraudulent document is encountered or if a PSCO believes
that the person presenting the certificate is not the person to whom it was issued,
then, the master and the nearest diplomatic counsel or maritime administration of the
flag state of the vessel should be contacted.  The procedure for onboard assessment
exists to determine if there are any deficiencies with regard to mariner competence.
If credence is to be given to the stated objective of the IMO with regard to port state
and flag state cooperation (as seen in Resolution A.787 (19) paragraph 1.3.3), it
would be wise to inform the flag state at the earliest possible time, ideally, at the
point at which an expanded inspection begins.  However, the PSCO should not have
to wait until the flag state representative appears, because the PSCO is well within
his or her authority to assess the competency of seafarers, if the expanded inspection
should lead in that direction.
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5.6  Fraudulent seafarer documents
STCW Regulation I/9 makes it mandatory for a Party to develop and maintain a
register of all seafarers (masters, officers and ratings), and the status of their
certification.  It further requires that they should make this information available to
other Parties who inquire about the status of a seafarer.  (STCW 95, pp. 28-29)
Although many flag states do not have this register in place yet, the development of
such registers and an easy way to access them worldwide in case a PSCO suspects a
fraudulent certificate, should assist PSCOs in verifying certificates.
Morrison (1997, p. 78) addresses this requirement for a registry:
Port State control authorities may also seek verification of the certificates
held by seafarers manning ships visiting their ports.  Wherever possible,
arrangements should be made to provide the information on demand 24 hours
per day, seven days a week.  This could be done through an operations center
which acts at all times as the communications center for responding to
distress messages, reports of oil spills and other incidents and emergencies.
Until these registers come on line, PSCOs should be trained to recognize legitimate
seafarer documentation.  Although frauds are increasingly sophisticated, training
should be provided because this is one of only two reasons that certificates presented
to PSCO should not be accepted.
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5.7  Transitional provisions
As seen in the preceding chapter, transitional provisions are a potential issue until the
year and beyond the year 2002.  PSCOs need to have specific training to address
these issues.  Although it is not possible to know the status of every nation with
regard to IMO conventions, a PSCO should, at a minimum, be aware of the different
type of transitional provisions in place and how they could affect the conduct of a
PSC Inspection.
5.8  The "White List"
Although the IMO did not intend to foster a negative view of parties not on the white
list, this view has become a victim of speculation.  Whatever the intention of the
IMO, they cannot dictate to port states what their procedure should be.  If a port state
decides to target crews trained in non-white list nations, little can be done to stop that
nation.  Concerns about the white list must be addressed at the national level and the
decisions reached by the port state with regard to operational prosecution of PSC
regarding the white list needs to be communicated as soon as possible to PSCOs.
5.9  Corruption
Flag state surveyors may act as a check to the power of the PSCO.  Involving the flag
state at the earliest possible point when a detention is considered will serve to
minimize any corruption which may result from PSC activities.  In addition, appeal
procedures for the master of a detained ship which are written into the maritime
legislation of a nation will assist greatly in this area.
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Chapter 6
The Port State Control Program in the United States
6.1 Introduction
It is important to note that the information contained in this chapter is based on
several conversations with personnel involved in the U.S. PSC program during the
months of March-June, 2000.  While all gave permission to use their information, not
one would give his or her permission to be quoted for this dissertation.  It is therefore
difficult to reference these sections, but every effort is made to differentiate between
the author’s personal knowledge and the information presented by the sources.
Where there is no reference provided, the information was previously known by the
author.
6.2  History and legal basis
The U.S. Port State Control Program officially began in 1994.  Prior to that year,
examinations of foreign vessels in U.S. ports were conducted under U.S domestic
law.  While foreign vessel examiners did check for compliance with international
conventions to which the U.S. was a signatory, the authority and guidance for these
examinations was found in domestic law.   For example, in 1968, the U.S. Congress
passed a law entitled “Fire Safety Standards for Foreign and Domestic Passenger
Vessels.”  Since that year, the U.S. has examined all passenger vessels calling in U.S.
ports to confirm compliance with that domestic law.  This program was called the
57
Control Verification Exam program, and it still exists today, and “. . . remains the
primary reason for the Coast Guard’s boarding of non-U.S. passenger ships.”
(Schrinner, 1997)
Other domestic laws which provided for the examination of foreign vessels in U.S.
ports were: the 1973 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (for all vessels operating in
U.S. waters); The Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, which contained specific
regulations for tankers and some that were also valid for all ships; and The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) which required Certificates of Financial
Responsibility (COFRs), Vessel Response Plans, and double hulls for tankers.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the international community, through the IMO, adopted
conventions which were comparable to the standards which the U.S. was using as a
basis for examining ships in U.S. ports.  The U.S. adopted these regulations while
keeping the previous domestic laws in force.  This reliance on domestic law for some
types of PSC activities creates many different types of vessel examinations into
which the enforcement of international laws and Conventions under PSC are
incorporated.  Foreign flag tanker and passenger vessels are examined per U.S. law
annually and issued U.S. documents.  Cargo vessels are subject to PSC inspections
per international conventions.  (USCG, 2000)
In 1994, the U.S. Congress tasked the Coast Guard with designing and implementing
a specific PSC program, with the primary purpose of eliminating substandard
shipping of all types from U.S. ports.  Instead of primarily focusing on tank and
passenger vessels, the U.S. would now examine all types of foreign-flagged ships in
U.S. ports for compliance with all international regulations, and continue enforcing
U.S. domestic law for all types of vessels.
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6.3  Training for Port State Control personnel
At the same time, training was modified to familiarize Coast Guard personnel with
international conventions which would define the new program.   From 1994-1998, a
course of instruction specifically for PSCOs was offered.  It took place at an
operational unit, Marine Safety Office Hampton Roads, Virginia, and involved unit
personnel as instructors.  This particular unit had many foreign vessels calling and
personnel at the unit had more familiarity than the Marine Safety School in
Yorktown with the international conventions and regulations.  In 1998, the elements
of this stand-alone PSCO course were incorporated into the curriculum of the Marine
Inspector Course (MIC) for junior officers and senior petty officers and the Marine
Safety Petty Officer Course (MSPOC), for petty officers.  Currently, when a graduate
of either school returns to his or her unit after attending either of these courses, the
command of each unit decides when that person is qualified to conduct PSC exams.
This usually occurs after completion of a local job qualification record and
sometimes an oral board. (USCG, 2000)
USCG Headquarters is currently performing a training needs analysis to determine
what training is needed for PSCOs, and how to implement this training should the
need materialize. (USCG, 2000)
6.4  Background of personnel involved in the U.S. Port State Control program
Current U.S. Coast Guard policy is to have a qualified marine inspector and a
qualified boarding officer on all PSC examinations. (USCG MSM, Vol. II, 2000, p.
D1-6) These persons are used in the execution of all types of Coast Guard
inspections, examinations and boardings, in addition to PSC. The term “Port State
Control Officer” is increasingly used however, there is no specific separate
qualification for this role.
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The background of those authorized to conduct PSC exams varies.  Some officers are
graduates of U.S. state maritime academies or the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy.
Of these, some have sea time in a licensed merchant marine officer capacity after
graduation from one of these academies, and some have no sea time as a licensed
merchant marine officer but do have sea time as a cadet.  Others are graduates of the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy and have had between two and five years of sea time as
either deck or engineer officers on Coast Guard ships before their first tour of duty in
the marine safety field.  Some are warrant officers with many years at sea, both as an
enlisted person and/or as an officer. Others have no experience on ships at all.  Of
those with experience, some are engineers and some are deck personnel.  Of those
with sea time, some have pursued professional merchant marine qualifications based
on their Coast Guard sea time. (USCG, 2000)
On the petty officer side, some are just out of a “A” school (vocational-level school)
with no maritime experience.  Others have three to fifteen years of sea time on
various Coast Guard ships.  As with officers, some have earned U.S. Merchant
Marine licenses or ratings, but most have never served on commercial vessels.
Most of these qualified personnel are military members, which means they are
transferred to a new assignment every two to four years.   It is estimated that
approximately 20% of the USCG workforce are reassigned each year.  Many will
never be reassigned to a PSC job again in their careers.  Of the six senior PSCOs
interviewed, five of six felt that lack of experience, both maritime (actually working
on a ship, either Coast Guard or merchant) and in PSC was the most significant issue
facing the Coast Guard’s PSC program.  Neither wanted to be identified, however,
one said:  “Our people do not specialize and stay in PSC.  We are losing them faster
than we can train them.” Another said:  “...we make due with what we have.  The
ships don’t stop entering port, so we just have to adapt.”  All PSCOs stressed that,
even with this lack of experience, the PSC program in the United States was
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operating effectively, but that it would be more effective with the addition and
retention of experienced personnel.  Senior officials in each port were quick to point
out that the lack of experience of marine inspectors and boarding officers is
overcome in part by providing a mechanism to communicate with the office during
any stage of a PSC exam.  Marine inspectors and boarding officers from most ports
carry cellular phones and a senior person is always on duty to answer questions from
the PSCO regarding a particular exam. (USCG, 2000)
The quality of the skills of these persons varies as much as their background, so it is
difficult if not impossible to draw conclusions as to the ideal background of a PSCO.
Some senior PSC officials believe that willingness to learn the job and ask questions
is what determines the quality of a PSCO.  Others feel that maritime experience is a
must.  In any case, all personnel who conduct PSC exams in the U.S. have all
completed a qualification based on a locally developed job qualification record.
Training Center Yorktown is developing a standardized job qualification that will be
competed in the fall of 2000 for implementation at the unit level. (USCG, 2000)
6.5  Current operational procedures in Port State Control exams
A PSC exam is conducted when a vessel is identified as a boarding target via what is
known as the “Boarding Priority Matrix”.  This system is based on risk assessment
methodology and it focuses existing resources on those vessels which are most likely
to pose a threat to persons, property and the environment.  It is based on historical
detention ratios and it contains five variables: flag state, classification society, vessel
owners and operators, history of vessel, and ship type.  Figure 6.1 on the next page
contains the current Boarding Priority Matrix in use.
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Figure 6.1  USCG Boarding Priority Matrix
OWNER
5 points
Listed Owner or
Operator
FLAG
7 points
Listed Flag
State
CLASS
Priority 1
>=10 arrivals with
detention ratio more
that 4 times the
average OR <10
arrivals and involved
with at least one
detention in the
previous three years.
5 points
>=10 arrivals with a
detention ratio
between 3 & 4 times
the average.
3 Points
>=10 arrivals with a
detention ratio
between 2& 3 times
the average.
1 Point
>= 10 arrivals with a
detention ratio
between the average
and twice the average.
0 Points
>=10 arrivals with a
detention ratio below
the average OR <10
arrivals with no
detentions in the
previous 3 years.
HISTORY
5 Points Each
Detention within the
previous 12 months.
1 Point Each
Other operational
control within the
previous 12 months.
1 Point Each
Casualty within the
previous 12 months
1 Point Each
Violation within the
previous 12 months.
1 Point Each
Not boarded within
the previous 6
months.
SHIP TYPE
1 Point
Oil or chemical
tanker
1 Point
Gas carrier
2 Points
Bulk freighter over
10 years old
1 Point
Passenger ship
2 Points
Carrying low value
commodities in bulk
Source:  USCG MSM, Vol. II, p. D4-13
Each of the five variables has a system for the distribution of points. The variables
owner/operator and flag state vary.  The Coast Guard maintains lists of targeted
owner/operators which is based on the detention amount in each 12-month period.  It
is possible for an owner/operator to be removed from the owner/operator list if
boarding performance changes in a twelve-month period.  Similarly, it is possible for
a flag state to be removed from the targeted list if its detention ratio (number of its
62
ships detained in last three years divided by total number of ships which called in
U.S. ports in the same period) falls below the average detention ratio for all flag
states. (USCG MSM, Vol. II, 2000, pp. D4-14-D4-16)
Classification society performance is seen as one of the most important factors in the
Coast Guard’s PSC program.  Each classification society is evaluated as to
performance over the past three years.  Again, detention ratios are computed and
compared to the average, and points are assigned accordingly.
The points are totaled and the vessels assigned a priority category.  Priority I vessels
either have 17 points on the matrix or the Captain of the Port has determined a vessel
is a threat to persons, property or the environment, or the vessel has been involved in
a marine casualty.  The Coast Guard may make an attempt to restrict entry into a port
until vessel is inspected.  If the vessel is already in port, the vessel will be examined.
Priority II vessels have either 7 points on the matrix or the vessel has outstanding
deficiencies from a previous boarding in a U.S. port, or, it is inspected under
domestic law for passenger vessels and tankers, and it is overdue for its annual exam.
In this case, the Coast Guard may restrict the cargo operations of the ship until it is
examined.  Priority III vessels have either 4-6 points on the matrix or a report of
alleged deficiencies have been reported or it is overdue for an annual exam for
freight vessels.  A priority IV vessel will have 3 or fewer points on the matrix.  Such
vessels will not be examined. (USCG MSM, Vol. II, 2000, pp. D4-14-D4-16)
After a vessel has been evaluated using the Boarding Priority Matrix, a PSC exam
team is put together.  The team usually consists of two persons, one of whom is a
qualified marine inspector, and the other either a junior marine inspector or a
boarding officer.  A boarding officer is a petty officer who has completed requisite
resident and on the job training, and then passed a local qualification board.  The
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boarding officer and the marine inspector will divide up the PSC tasks, depending on
the experience of each.  An exam lasts an average of four hours.
Guidance for PSC examinations in the U.S. is found in a number of publications.
The domestic laws referred to earlier in this chapter form the authority for the Coast
Guard to conduct these exams.  The Marine Safety Manual, Vol. II, contains the
purpose and philosophy behind these examinations, as well as guidance on the
composition of exam teams, and operational procedures.  In addition, various
Navigation and Vessel Information Circulars (commonly known as NVICs), and
standard messages (for interim guidance) contain specific policy guidance such as
how to enforce STCW 95 and the ISM code in the course of PSC inspections.  Most
of these laws and policy have been combined into various “examination books”,
which enable an examiner to go through the exam in a detailed, orderly manner by
filling in a “checklist”.  A PSC job aid has also been constructed to assist PSCOs in
conducting PSC exams.
The Marine Safety Manual, Vol. II (USCG, 2000, p D1-7), states the purpose of Port
State Control exams in the United States:
Port state control examinations . . . are intended to be of sufficient breadth
and depth to satisfy a boarding team that a vessel’s major systems are in
compliance with applicable international standards and domestic
requirements, and that the crew possesses sufficient proficiency to safely
operate the vessel.  These examinations are designed to determine that
required certificates are aboard and valid, and that a vessel conforms to the
conditions required for issuance of required certificates.  This is
accomplished by a walk through examination and visual assessment of a
vessel’s relevant components, certificates and documents, and may be
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accompanied by a limited testing of systems and the crew.  When the
examination reveals questionable equipment, systems, or crew
incompetence, the boarding team may expand the examination to conduct
such operational tests or examinations as deemed appropriate.
6.6  Onboard assessments of crew competency
During the PSC inspection, PSCOs are authorized to assess crew competency under
three major international Conventions, SOLAS, including the ISM Code, MARPOL,
and STCW 78 and 95.  Unlike the Paris and Tokyo MOUs, the U.S. conducts
emergency drills (fire and boat) as part of a general inspection.  In other words, no
clear grounds are needed.   The PSCO directs the Master or Chief Officer to start the
drill in the customary fashion, and then watches the crew’s response to the
emergency.  A comparison with the standards in the Marine Safety Manual will
indicate to the PSCO if a crew has met the standards or whether the crew needs to do
the drill again.  A second poor performance will constitute a “failure” of fire and boat
drills.  The PSCO, in consultation with the Master, will then determine the time and
date of the next attempt.
Under STCW 95, a PSCO can conduct assessments of competency under an
expanded exam.  An expanded exam can occur if the vessel has been involved in a
collision, grounding, or illegal discharge of substances, or if the Captain of the Port
determines that the vessel has been operated in an erratic or unsafe manner.  Also, if
a PSCO determines that a vessel poses a danger to persons, property or the
environment, then an expanded examination can be ordered.  These expanded
examinations will always be completed in cooperation with the flag state.  Although
the Coast Guard has accepted this provision for onboard assessments of competency
under STCW 95, USCG personnel could not cite a specific case where the provision
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had been used.  At this time, PSCOs use guidance found in NVIC 3-98 to cite STCW
95 deficiencies with regard to rest periods, crew familiarization training, Basic
Seafarer Training for persons with emergency duties, and absence of certificates.
Under the ISM Code (SOLAS Chapter IX), Regulation I/14, vessel owners must
require that seafarers serving onboard their vessels must be familiar with their
specific duties and with all vessel arrangements, procedures and vessel characteristics
relevant to their duties.  They must also know what to do in emergency situations.  If,
in the course of a general exam, a PSCO feels that the crew cannot successfully carry
out their responsibilities, an expanded exam with an assessment of competency
(using the tables in STCW 95 part A) may be conducted, in cooperation with the flag
state. Because of the transitional arrangements under STCW, an assessment of this
type under an expanded exam has not been conducted.  However, operational checks
of equipment which rely on competency of the crew, are currently performed.
When a PSC exam is completed and deficiencies are noted, the Office of Compliance
in the Office of Marine Safety and Environmental Protection (referred to as G-MOC)
is notified. The vessel deficiencies are immediately reviewed to determine if they are
severe enough to warrant a detention under an international convention.  If they are,
the detention stands. If not, the Captain of the Port is notified and if he or she decides
that the vessel could be detained under a U.S. law, the detention will remain.  The
Captain of the Port will monitor the efforts of the vessel to rectify the situation which
caused the detention.  Shortly after the detention, G-MOC will review each detention
and determine which body is responsible for the reason for the detention; flag state,
classification society, or owner.  Letters are sent to the involved parties within 30
days.  Upon receipt of the letter, each entity may respond with an appeal if they feel
the attribution is wrong.  The Captain of the Port, the CG District containing that
Captain of the Port office and finally, G-MOC review each case and issues a final
decision of appeals. (Schrinner, 1997)
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Examining the statistics, the U.S. Port State Control program and subsequently, the
number of ships detained has leveled off after initially increasing, as shown in Table
6.2:
Table 6.2  U.S. Coast Guard PSC Detentions 1992-1999
YEAR DETENTIONS DISTINCT
ARRIVALS *
1992 16 7406
1993 55 7315
1994 275 7735
1995 514 7835
1996 476 7585
1997 547 7415
1998 373 7880
1999 257 7617
Source:  U.S. Coast Guard, 1999
*note:  “Distinct Arrivals” are the number of ships >=300GT that make at
least one visit to a U.S. port in 1999.  For example:  a vessel which makes 12
U.S. port calls in 1999 would be counted as 1 distinct vessel arrival. (U.S.
Coast Guard, 1999)
Detentions, on the whole, are clearly down, however, of particular interest is a
statement in the official USCG PSC report for 1999:
 . . . over 25% of the vessels detained in 1999 were detained because of the
crew’s poor performance during a fire or abandon ship drill.  Despite
improved standards that require basic familiarization training, and the
implementation of STCW 95, many vessel crews still have difficulty
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demonstrating emergency procedures related to ship safety. (U.S. Coast
Guard, 2000, p. 2)
The 1999 Port State Control report categorized detention reasons as follows:
                    Table 6.3 U. S. Detention Category Statistics for 1999
Category Frequency of
deficiencies on
detained vessels
Certificates/Logbooks 38
Crew 40
Accommodation 2
Food and Catering 1
Life Saving Appliances 99
Fire Fighting Appliances 98
Accident Prevention 4
Safety In General 73
Cargo 2
Load Lines 19
Mooring Arrangements 2
Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery 41
Navigation 11
Radio 20
MARPOL, Annex I 32
Tankers 4
SOLAS Related Operational Deficiencies
(Fire and Abandon Ship Drills)
133
ISM Related Deficiencies 34
      Source:  U.S. Coast Guard, 2000
As with detention data from the MOUs, detention data reveal that reasons for
detention can sometimes be blurred.  A ship with several detainable deficiencies
could be listed in many categories.  When investigating the number of detentions due
specifically to crew competence issues, the “certificates,” “ISM,” and “safety in
general” categories must also be checked in addition to the “drill deficiency”
category.
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6.7  Comments on the status of the U.S. Port State Control program
According to the six senior U.S. PSCOs surveyed, the U.S. Port State Control
program is operating effectively despite trained personnel shortages and disparity in
training procedures and professional backgrounds of personnel involved in the PSC
program.  Certainly, vessels are being detained, and deficiencies are being rectified.
The U.S. appears to be on par with other nations of the Paris and Tokyo MOUs when
number of ships detained is considered. However, it is difficult to determine
measures of effectiveness for this program.  Is world shipping safer because of the
efforts of U.S. PSC officers?  More specifically, are crews which pose a threat to
persons, property or the environment identified through this program?  If not, what
organizational measures are needed to ensure that U.S. personnel involved in PSC
can enforce all applicable conventions, specifically STCW 95, when the transitional
periods are over in 2002?  Specific issues relating to the training of U.S. PSCOs will
be covered in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Training of Port State Control Officers
7.1  Introduction
This chapter will only cover training of PSCOs in relation to what has been discussed
in this paper, namely, the conduct of onboard assessments of competency.  This area
of PSC needs to be investigated separately from the inspection of ship structural
systems because different skills are required to perform an assessment vice a check
on a piece of equipment.  Whereas investigations of hardware systems depend on the
more black and white judgement of whether an item or a piece of equipment is
present and operating effectively, assessments of competency involve the more gray
area of human behavior and the man-machine interface.
7.2  Experience of PSCOs
The worldwide shortage of maritime officers has resulted in a corresponding shortage
of experienced PSCOs.  It is increasingly common for PSCOs worldwide not to have
operational maritime experience.  A good worldwide training program, taking into
account this inexperience, is necessary.  Those nations of developed MOUs need to
tailor any training programs they offer as aid to nations with a less developed
infrastructure to take into consideration the experience factor of potential PSCOs.
According to Resolution A787(19), a PSCO should be: “. . . an experienced officer
qualified as a flag state surveyor” and “. . . able to communicate in English with key
70
crew.”  In addition, if a particular PSCO will be conducting operational checks, he or
she should either:
• be a master or chief engineer with sea time
• have a maritime related qualifications from an Administration-approved
institution plus specialized training
• have an equivalent level of experience and training and be a qualified
Administration officer.
 
 Some MOUs go beyond these minimum qualifications.  For example, the Paris MOU
has determined that a PSCO must have completed at least one year as a flag state
surveyor and be a master (1600 GT or more) with at least five years at sea as an
officer or chief engineer (3000 KW or more) with at least five years at sea as an
officer, or “a naval architect, mechanical engineer, or an engineer related to maritime
fields and worked in that capacity for at least 5 years.  An alternate route to
qualification exists if a person has a “relevant university degree” and has been
qualified as a result of training “at a school for ship safety inspectors”, and has been
a flag state surveyor for at least two years.  (Paris MOU, 1982, annex 6, chapter 1)
 
 The level of experience required by the Paris MOU is only possible in nations which
have a long-standing maritime infrastructure. The nations of the Paris MOU and
Australia have a large labor pool of experienced seagoing personnel from which to
choose.  These nations can also afford to pay PSCOs a salary commensurate with
their experience.  Many nations do not have the candidates from which to choose, nor
the resources to pay them a suitable wage.  Some nations, such as the U.S., and
others whose maritime authorities are under a military system, either Navy or Coast
Guard, may or may not have the experience recommended by the IMO.  This
inexperience of PSCOs has both practical and legal implications.
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 Practically, the assessment procedure set up in the control provisions of STCW 95
are geared toward those nations with PSCOs with experience.  The capacity for
professional judgement is presupposed.  However, because so many PSCOs around
the world are inexperienced, it is no longer possible to rely on a previous
qualification for the exercise of judgement.  It must be a subject of training.  But, is it
possible to train judgement?
 
 Legally, the judgement made by a PSCO during a control action may be open to
question because the judgement is not backed up by experience.  This potential
liability has led many nations to adopt a “checklist” system of PSC inspection.
Although this approach is derided by some nations, it is effective when the inspection
needs to take place in a limited amount of time by persons who do not possess a large
amount of shipboard experience.  Also, because the checklist leaves little to chance,
legal risk is reduced.  As the supply of experienced officers dwindles in traditional
maritime nations, more surveyors with less experience will be the result, so this is not
just a problem in developing nations or in nations which use their military as a source
for PSCOs.
 
 7.3  Importance of PSCO training on onboard assessments of competency
 
 Onboard assessments of competency are occurring every day in PSC Inspections
around the world.  However, a review of training programs (USCG, Tokyo MOU,
Paris MOU) reveals that no training is provided in how to perform them.  It would be
valuable to have training standards for what is being performed now and for what
could be performed in the future regarding assessments of competency under STCW
95.  There are several other reasons for having a strong PSCO training program in
assessments of competency:
1. Port State Control has many international implications, especially with regard to
relations between nations.  It is essential that PSCOs conduct their mission with
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as little error and with as much consistency (both within the nation and with other
nations) as possible.  Solid initial training and periodic feedback will ensure with
greater probability that this happens.
2. It is important from a legal standpoint to have trained PSCOs.  A detention made
on the basis of a judgement of an untrained or poorly trained PSCO will not stand
up to retrospective legal scrutiny.
3. While not totally eradicating the element of lack of experience, a strong training
program can go a long way toward ensuring that PSCOs are confident to conduct
onboard assessments to the limits of their ability.
4. PSC has the potential to be a strong tool in assisting the IMO in its avowed
mission of Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas.  The statistical analyses of various
assessments of competency during PSC inspections can be used to identify
concerns with particular flag states, licensing states, and training nations.
5. Consistency of PSC efforts worldwide depends on a set of training standards.  It
is preferable that this consistency runs through all the “threads” of competency.
In other words, an assessment of competency in the PSC world will be the same
as a seafarer experienced in his or her training scheme.
6. Training in onboard assessments will facilitate the integration of onboard
assessments into the PSC process without unduly increasing the time needed for
PSC activities.  The more a person is trained, the less time it will take to perform
onboard assessments.
7. Lastly and most importantly, enhanced training will allow a PSCO to be less
focused on a certificate check and more focused on broader actual reality onboard
a ship.  In other words, PSCOs can be trained to look for those ships in which the
letter of the law has been observed (they have all of the certificates), but maybe
not the spirit of the law (the certificates do not reflect the actual condition of the
ship).
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 7.4  Specific aspects of training for PSCOs
 
 This section will only cover training procedures that are relevant to a PSCO
performing the three types of onboard assessments of competency identified in
previous chapters.  Briefly, these are: operational checks of equipment, fire and life
boat drills, and onboard assessments of competency under STCW 95. Generally,
STCW 95 advocates that a person performing onboard assessments of competency in
the training situation be first, skilled in the task that he or she is assessing, and
secondly, trained in assessment techniques.  This standard should apply to PSCOs,
also.  In addition to these two qualifications recommended by the IMO, a discussion
of training to enable PSCOs to effectively conduct onboard assessments of
competency can begin with a task analysis of a PSCO in these three areas.
 Operational checks of equipment
• recognize evidence that seafarers are not be familiar with equipment or
procedures.
• know appropriate procedure for testing competency.
• judge action of seafarer against criteria (yet unestablished)
• if seafarer does not demonstrate competence adequately, determine to what extent
lack of competency poses a danger to persons, property or the environment.
 Fire and Lifeboat Drills
• determine whether demonstration of drill is required (irrelevant for U.S., Vina del
Mar, and certain expanded inspections in the Paris MOU, where no clear grounds
are required).
• ensure that drill is conducted safely.
• judge drill performance against a criteria to determine competency.
• if performance does not meet criteria, determine whether detention criteria are
met.
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 Assessments of competency under STCW 95
• determine the validity of certificates and licenses presented to him/her.  If there is
reason to suspect the certificates are either fraudulent or fraudulently obtained,
then he or she must confirm this.
• despite the validity of such certificates, determine whether or not the ship’s
certificates reflect the actual condition of the ship and crew (recognition and
judgement of clear grounds)
• conduct an assessment of watchkeeping skills if there are clear grounds.
• judge this assessment against criteria
• determine whether or not the results of the assessment indicate a situation which
is a danger to persons, property or the environment
In this analysis, it is clear that a lot of the PSCO’s job with regard to onboard
assessments is dependent on professional judgement of the PSCO.   However, if the
PSCO is not a mariner, he or she must develop this judgement through training and
experience as a PSCO, not as a mariner.  As the U.S. Coast Guard has advocated, you
can be a professional PSCO without being a professional mariner.
As stated previously, PSCOs conducting onboard assessments should be skilled in
the task they are assessing and have been trained in assessment methods.  While it
appears that these criteria only pose a problem for new PSC enterprises, this is not
the case.  Nations with long-standing PSC programs are also affected in two ways:
first, many surveyors from established nations were trained prior to 1995, before
STCW, the ISM Code, GMDSS, ECDIS, and AIS were realities or possibilities.
Possession of a license does not necessarily imply that a person has a skill that needs
to be assessed.  In fact, before Australia began their campaign on checking
operational requirements of GMDSS in 1999, they needed to send most of the
surveyors to a training class to become competent in the operational aspects of
GMDSS (AMSA, 2000, p. 9).  Secondly, checks of hardware during PSC inspections
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have so dominated the PSC world that there are few PSCOs trained in assessment
techniques.
7.5  Recommended training for the U.S. PSC program
The PSC program in the United States is operating effectively.  As mentioned briefly
in chapter six, the Coast Guard is reviewing PSC training procedures for a possible
change from having PSC elements contained in the MIC course to a stand-alone
course.  Given the international importance of PSC, a stand-alone course is
warranted.  This is also a good time to change some of the PSC emphasis from
structural systems to human systems.  As owners, flag states and class societies allow
less infractions of materiel condition, an emphasis on human systems which can be
assessed during a PSC exam is appropriate and timely.  At a minimum, enhanced
training for the onboard assessments that already occur during a PSC inspection
should be contemplated.  Training PSCOs in assessment techniques is a necessity if
detentions for operational deficiencies that meet international legal standards is to
continue.  The next section will outline recommendations regarding the U.S. Coast
Guard PSC training program.
Figure 7.1  Recommended Training for U.S. PSCOs
Engineering Operations
Deck Operations
Port State
Control Basic
Course
Marine
Inspector
Course
Tanker Operations
Cargo Operations
Passenger Vessel Operations
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One obvious solution is to hire civilian merchant mariners or use only Maritime
Academy graduates (MARGRADS) to fill PSCO billets.  This is a good solution for
ensuring a certain level of knowledge, however, it would require a change of billet
structure and additional funding, which may or may not be possible any given year.
In any case, training needs to address the need for PSCOs now.  As shown in chapter
6, there are many levels of experience present in the ranks of PSCOs in the United
States.  It is possible to design a modular training program that would be appropriate
for all levels.  In other words, a person who is more experienced should be able to
audit some of the training related to his or her experience.  For example, a recent
MARGRAD does not need to attend Basic Safety Training again, however, a recent
graduate of A school with little or no shipboard experience should attend it.
Figure 7.1 is a representation of optimum training for a PSCO.  A good starting point
for PSCO training is to complete the Marine Inspector Course (MIC).  This will
ensure that he or she has training in inspection procedures and the technical
background necessary to execute the hardware side of PSC.
The next step should be a two-week course entitled PSC Basic, focusing on basic
safety and shipboard administration.  At a minimum, the course should contain
training on:
1. PSC provisions of International Conventions and IMO Resolutions, with special
emphasis on STCW 95 and IMO Resolution A787(19).
2. Worldwide PSC MOUs and their respective operations and statistics.
3. Recognition of valid certificates and understanding of transitional provisions.
4. Determination that certificates issued to the ship reflect the actual condition of
the ship.
5. Recognition of the existence of a shipboard safety culture (ISM Code).
6. Merchant ship administration
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7. Seafarer Basic Training including familiarization as outlined in Chapter VI of
STCW 95, specifically, page 111, Tables A-VI/1-1, 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4
respectively, and Table A-VI/2-1.   This section would include participation in
several shipboard drills.
8. Onboard assessment techniques for:
• English proficiency
• basic safety operational checks
• fire and lifeboat drills
• basic safety demonstrations of competency under STCW 95 (relevant to the
aforementioned tables).
 Although having a military member of the USCG take a course containing these
subjects may seem of dubious value, the recommended course content would serve
several functions: first, it would meet the criteria recommended by the IMO with
regard to a person being skilled in the task they are assessing and have training in
assessment techniques; second, it would give a PSCO confidence that he or she
possesses the skills necessary to conduct onboard assessments; third, it would serve
to correlate CG knowledge with merchant marine knowledge; and fourth, it would be
a self contained course which would be valuable for export to other nations and
MOUs.
 
 After the initial PSC basic, a PSCO would be authorized to conduct certain
assessments up to the level of his or her knowledge.  To further enhance this
knowledge, a series of workshops could be introduced, including: deck operations
(including GMDSS), engineering operations (including MARPOL), tanker
operations, cargo operations, and passenger vessel operations.  Course content should
reflect competencies in the appropriate places in STCW 95, however, the objective of
these workshops would not be to impart all knowledge in the competency tables.  It
would be appropriate to focus on several operational checks in each area that can be
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performed in the limited time of a PSC exam.  A USCG member or civilian who
already possessed a license would need to take only the “how to assess” part of the
workshop.
 
 The philosophy of PSC is just as important as the procedures.   With that in mind, all
PSCOs need to know:
• the limits of their authority and ability
• that little used maritime skills inevitably deteriorate (there is a difference between
competence and forgetting something).
• there is more than one way to do certain tasks,
• we are only testing the bare minimum of compliance when we use STCW 95.
7.6  Additional comments on USCG PSCO training
An important training element in modern maritime education and training is the
increasing use of simulators, which can be a valuable tool in assessment as well as
training.  The use of simulators for training PSCOs in assessment techniques should
be considered.  There are several types of simulators in use today, including: full
bridge, radar, GMDSS, engine room, liquid cargo handling, and bulk cargo handling.
Warsash Maritime Center in Southhampton, U.K. has used their engine room
simulator to train PSCOs from the Paris MOU for two years.  The results have been
very promising, with then net effect that a PSCO has gained confidence in a training
setting rather than a more high pressure actual PSC inspection.
Distance learning is another technology that can be incorporated into the training
program.  The European Port State Control Officer Training (EPSCOT) program uses
a self contained CD-ROM to teach many of the preliminaries of PSC.  With proper
oversight, a potential PSCO could be required to complete a self-study program prior
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to arrival at the PSC course.  Subjects suitable for distance learning should be
researched with this goal in mind.
A final note with regard to those cases in which a very high level onboard assessment
is needed (for example for the Captain or Chief Engineer): a cadre of U.S. Navy
officers who are also merchant mariners can be found in the U.S. Navy Merchant
Marine Individual Ready Reserve Group (MMIRRG) program.  Many of them are
involved in either USMMA or state maritime academies.  These officers are required
to complete a minimum of two weeks a year of Annual Training (AT) per year.
Currently, there is a standing billet for each two-week period of the year at the USCG
National Maritime Center (NMC).  These officers wear the Navy uniform but
complete USCG missions at the NMC.  A similar program for PSC can be
constructed where MMIRRG officers complete PSCO training and make themselves
available on a regional on-call basis for more difficult assessments.  There are
financial as well as practical benefits to such an arrangement, as the MMIRRG
officers are funded by the Navy.  The need for such expertise should be apparent
within the first two years of operation of such a program.  If enough “in-house” talent
existed in the Coast Guard, or the need for such high level assessments did not
materialize, then the program could be discontinued.
The point to remember is that the Coast Guard needs to be ready to exercise the PSC
powers granted by various IMO Conventions to the fullest extent.  A thorough
training program coupled with an advanced plan would ensure that the USCG can
accomplish all PSC missions, both those related to ship structural systems and human
systems.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1  Introduction
Any discussion of the feasibility of onboard assessments must certainly ask whether
it is even necessary to have a provision for them in the first place.  There are three
reasons why they are necessary: first, the statistics of the MOUs and the U.S. indicate
that questionable operational competence is an established problem in maritime
world (see chapter 3 for statistics and comments).  Two possible reasons for this are:
some seafarers were trained under the pre-STCW 95 system (which did not offer
criteria for minimum standards), and the crewing practice of some companies does
not allow for the required vessel familiarization.   Second, there are still flag states
and class societies that do not provide any significant oversight to mariners that they
certify under their flag.  Fraudulent certification is a related problem.  Third, it is
clear from the words in STCW 95 and related documents referenced in this
dissertation, that the authors of STCW 95 envisioned a purpose for onboard
assessments of competency in the course of PSC inspections.
8.2  The need for onboard assessments: the GMDSS case
The case for the need for onboard assessments can be bolstered by a recent example.
A significant change to shipboard communications occurred when the IMO adopted
provisions for the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System.  The radio officer
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position on most ships was eliminated and the ship’s deck officers absorbed radio
functions.  In order to comply with this change by the stated date of 01 February
1999, officers needed to have completed a training course in GMDSS to be certified
to operate the equipment.
The transition has not been an easy one.  During the time GMDSS has been
operational, a significant number of false alarms are recorded every day.  The
disturbing number of false alarms have been commented on in the confidential
reporting schemes MARS, maintained by the Nautical Institute.  One report
quantified the problem:  “On a voyage from the U.S. to North Africa and up to
Rotterdam a total of 552 alerts were received over a period of 26 days and at the
worst point 38 were received during one watch alone.  This equates to an average of
21 erroneous messages per day.  A second ship maintained a similar record and noted
15/20 calls per day.”  The contributor goes on to state that all messages received were
erroneous, and speculated most of these erroneous messages were caused by
shipboard operator error. (MARS, 1999)
The amount of operator error certainly points to a perception of incompetence among
those on ships charged with operating GMDSS.  Reasons for this incompetence could
include either substandard training or fraudulent certification.  Preliminary results of
the fraudulent seafarer documentation study sponsored by the IMO indicate that
“GMDSS certificates in particular seem to be readily available.” (IMO, 2000, p. 22)
Australia was particularly interested in ensuring the proficiency of GMDSS operators
calling on their ports.  In preparation for the 01 February 1999 enforcement deadline,
AMSA provided all of its surveyors advanced training in GMDSS and prepared
inspection guidelines.  The amount of deficiencies was alarming.  According to their
1999 report:  “During the year a number of ships were detained due to their radio
installation not complying with GMDSS requirements or ships’ operators not being
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competent in the equipment’s operation.”  (AMSA, 2000, p. 9) In fact, the total
number of radio deficiencies increased almost 70% when compared with statistics
from the previous year.
Clearly, this type of onboard assessment enhanced maritime safety by directly
reducing the likelihood of more false alerts.  The advent of standardization
regulations for ECDIS and AIS could prompt similar campaigns in the future.
8.3  Review of the objectives of this dissertation
The specific objectives of this dissertation as outlined in chapter one were:
• to ascertain prevailing attitudes of those involved in PSC activities (MOUs,
USCG personnel, people in the shipping industry, P&I clubs, and mariners) about
the practicality of onboard assessments.
• to address concerns raised within the framework of the what is permitted under
international conventions and what is practical under prevailing conditions in the
shipping industry.
• to emphasize the need for international standardization of terms, operational
procedures, purpose for detentions, reporting procedures, and analysis of
information with regard to onboard assessments of competency.
• to propose a starting point for standardization.
• to investigate the training needs for a consistent application of PSC efforts in the
area of onboard assessments of competency.
A look at these objectives will reveal that this dissertation was only a starting point
for discussion of the issue of onboard assessments of competency.  More research
needs to be done in this area, especially by maritime authorities and the IMO.
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8.4   Conclusions
Two of the elements of the IMO Secretary General’s vision for the 2000s are
“shifting emphasis onto people” and  “ensuring the effective uniform implementation
of existing IMO standards and regulations relating to maritime safety and
environmental protection, placing particular emphasis on the implementation of the
revised STCW Convention, and the ISM Code...” (IMO Res.A900(21), 1999)
Resolving the questions related to onboard assessments of competency so that
PSCOs can use this valuable tool to check the human systems of a vessel will further
both of those goals, and thus further the cause of maritime safety.  Guidance for this
task needs to come from the body which envisioned this provision, the IMO, after
consistent, fair, and legal analysis of the provisions, comparison with current PSC
practice, the limitations of PSC, and the practicality of onboard assessments during
PSC inspections.  An operational handbook for all onboard assessments of
competency; operational checks, fire and lifeboat drills, and assessments of
competency under STCW should be the result.  Training for PSCOs should reflect
the results of this analysis.
If the IMO is slow to act, individual nations and MOUs should develop their own
handbooks for onboard assessments of competency, keeping in mind the issues
presented in the preceding chapter and a methodology for standardizing all PSC
activities in which a PSCO has to use his or her assess the competency of a mariner,
and with special attention to what is currently being performed. Although
standardization from the international level is the most desirable situation,
standardization within a nation’s or region’s ports would be a start toward this goal.
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8.5  Recommendations
As a result of the conclusions drawn in this paper, the following are recommended
actions:
1. Nations and the IMO should survey current practice in PSC and determine to
what level onboard assessments of competency are occurring.
2. Pursuant to agreement that what is occurring constitutes onboard assessment,
then standard assessment methodology regarding procedure and training should
be adopted and applied to all onboard assessments of competency during PSC
Inspections.
3. Training of PSCOs in all MOUs should be changed to reflect a more equal
balance of checks on structural systems and human systems, including an
emphasis on assessment techniques
4. The IMO should promulgate a manual for onboard assessments, codifying current
practice and adding all that is allowable under each convention, especially STCW
95, and recommended procedures.
5. The U.S. should re-instate a stand-alone PSCO course with more emphasis on
skill acquisition and assessment techniques.
6. The IMO should standardize, catalogue, analyze and publicize statistics on
onboard assessments of competency so that effectiveness of PSC efforts in this
area can be gauged.
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Appendix A
LIST OF NATIONS INVOLVED IN EACH MOU
Paris MOU Vina del Mar MOU Tokyo MOU
Members:
Belgium
Canada
Croatia
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russian Federation
Spain
Sweden
U.K.
Observers:
Japan
USA
IMO
ILO
Tokyo MOU
Iceland
Members:
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Ecuador
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Observers:
IMO
CEPAL
Members:
Australia
Canada
China
Fiji
Indonesia
Japan
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Russian Federation
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Vanuatu
Viet Nam
Hong Kong (China)
Observers:
Brunei
USA
IMO
ILO
ESCAP
Paris MOU
Indian Ocean MOU
        Source  IMO News, 2000, pp.16-19
    Continued on next page
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Appendix A
LIST OF NATIONS INVOLVED IN EACH MOU
Caribbean MOU Mediterranean
MOU
Indian Ocean MOU
Members:
Anguilla
Antigua & Barbuda
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Montserrat
Netherlands Antilles
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the
  Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
Turks & Caicos
Observers:
IMO
ILO
CARICOM
IACS
Canada
USA
Netherlands
Paris MOU
Vina del Mar MOU
Tokyo MOU
Members:
Algeria
Cyprus
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Malta
Lebanon
Morocco
Tunisia
Turkey
Palestinian Authority
Observers:
IMO
ILO
EC
Members:
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
India
Iran
Kenya
Maldives
Mauritius
Mozambique
Seychelles
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tanzania
Yemen
Observers:
IMO
ILO
PMAESA
        Source  IMO News, 2000, pp.16-19
    Continued on next page
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Appendix A
LIST OF NATIONS INVOLVED IN EACH MOU
Abuja MOU Black Sea MOU
Members:
Benin
Cape Verde
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Liberia
Mauritania
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Togo
Observers:
IMO
ILO
MOWCA
Burkina Faso
Mali
Members:
Bulgaria
Georgia
Romania
Russian Federation
Turkey
Ukraine
    Source  IMO News, 2000, pp.16-19
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